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The author critically evaluates the judiciary's activist role in
striking down legislation directed toward mitigating the delete-
rious effects of excessive and unaccountable campaign financ-
ing of ballot initiatives and referenda. Moreover, the author
proffers evidence as well as analytical models to persuade the
courts of the need for legislative reform of campaign financing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the dangers posed by excessive and unaccounta-
ble campaign financing, states and municipalities throughout the
country have enacted legislation to preserve and foster direct de-
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mocracy.1 Yet, over the last decade, the judiciary has played an
activist role in striking down and modifying this legislative initia-
tive. In so doing, the courts have subjected ballot proposition re-
form to even stricter scrutiny than reform directed at candidate
elections. Sadly, as the courts have struck down spending and con-
tribution limitations on ballot propositions, they, in turn, have al-
lowed campaign financing to play a significantly larger role in de-
termining ballot results than states and municipalities have
desired.2
This judicial activism has troubled many legal scholars and
political analysts. This Article will explore certain perceived weak-
nesses and inconsistencies in these judicial opinions that have lim-
ited direct democracy. It will demonstrate, that even if one were to
accept the Supreme Court's narrowing of the legitimate goals of
campaign finance reform of ballot propositions, the goals that the
Court has held justify reform are themselves subject to a variety of
interpretations.' In addition, the Supreme Court and certain lower
courts have exacerbated this ambiguity by failing to use agreed-
upon definitions and precision in explaining their political
activism.
A main reason for the controversy surrounding judicial activ-
ism in campaign finance reform is that many observers believe that
the judiciary has undermined the basic raison d'etre of elections in
democratic societies: political equality. An examination of the evi-
dence supporting this assertion will demonstrate that judicial ac-
tivity has very likely enabled monied interests to alter the results
1. Direct democracy is defined here as citizens voting directly on issues (ballot proposi-
tions) rather than on representatives who then speak for voters. The word encompasses both
initiatives (issues placed on the ballot by citizen petition, which is allowed in 23 states) and
referenda (issues referred to the voters either by the legislature or by the citizen petition).
For more on this practice, see REFERENDUMS Chs. 4, 5 (A. Ranney & D. Butler eds. 1978).
Most commentators have criticized the judiciary's response to campaign finance reform.
Among the most comprehensive works on the subject are: Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The
Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L.
REv. 323; and Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SUP.
CT. REv. 1 (1977). For a critique of the Court's philosophy behind its campaign finance
reform decisions, see Shockley, Money in Politics: Judicial Roadblocks to Campaign Fi-
nance Reform, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 679 (1984).
2. The Court has unquestionably demonstrated its recognition of the legitimacy of di-
rect democracy. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668
(1976). Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority in support of direct democracy, said
"[a] referendum cannot. . . be characterized as a delegation of power. Under our constitu-
tional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can delegate it to representative
instruments which they create." Id. at 672.
3. See infra p.-.
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of numerous ballot proposition elections. The analysis will turn to
the question of whether enough empirical evidence can be mar-
shalled to convince the Court to uphold campaign finance reform
legislation aimed at more stringently regulating funding in ballot
proposition elections.
After a discussion of the most recent cases and the quality of
arguments and evidence used in these cases, this Article will con-
clude with a discussion of alternative routes that can be used to
limit the impact of monied interests on ballot propositions. In ad-
dition, this Article will question the effectiveness of the judiciary's
blocking of the legislative reform that most states and municipali-
ties already have taken.
As the frequency of initiatives and referenda in states and mu-
nicipalities has grown over the last decade, 4 campaign finance re-
form simultaneously has become a much more prominent issue.5
Political activity on these matters has occurred at a time of grow-
ing political alienation, declining confidence in political institu-
tions, and steadily decreasing voter turnout." The confluence of
4. For a list of the number of propositions voted on by each state from 1968 to 1982,
see D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, app. C (1984). Delaware has had the fewest ballot propositions with one; California
has had the most with 176. For an examination of the upsurge in the use of the initiative
process in the 1970's, see D. Schmidt, Ballot Initiatives: A Brief History, 1980 Election
Analysis, and a Look at Trends, (1981), at 2-5.
5. As the post-Watergate concern for campaign finance reform affected candidate races,
numerous states passed laws that restrict and police campaign spending on ballot proposi-
tions. As of 1978, 31 states restricted corporate political activity, and 18 of these states
either prohibited or limited corporate contributions on ballot issue campaigns. First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
6. For a number of years, the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social
Research at the University of Michigan has been asking citizens the following question:
"Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for
themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people?" Gradually, more people have
responded that they believe that a few big interests run government. In 1958, only 18% of
the respondants agreed with that view, but by 1980, 76% believed that a few big interests
run government. Opinion Roundup, 4 PUB. OPINION 34 (1981).
Among the many sources on steadily decreasing voter turnout is W. CROTTY & G. JACOB-
SON, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE (1980). The authors note that "in comparisons [sic] with
twenty-one other democratic countries, the United States ranks last." Id. at 5. They note
further that:
American voting turnout over time is decreasing and it has reached unusual
lows.... Nonvoters are basically inactive on all levels. If people do not vote, the
chances are excellent they will not participate in any other form of political pro-
cess. In effect, they remain outside the political system, unrepresented and
ignored.
Id. at 6, 13. "The turnaround in indicators of public trust, efficacy, and faith in government
in less than two decades has been remarkable." Id. at 248.
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these forces has emphasized the purpose of direct democracy: to
bypass and reform the more stagnant and potentially corrupt gov-
ernmental processes. 7
The states' passage of more effective disclosure laws, which re-
vealed that American political interests are spending considerable,
and to many observers shocking amounts of money on ballot pro-
posals, has fueled the perceived need for campaign finance reform
on ballot propositions.8 The reason contributors donate so much
money is easily understood once one recognizes that they have a
significant political interest in the outcome of ballot propositions.'
7. For more on the origins, history, and purpose of direct democracy in America, see
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 310 n.8 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting); Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States with Respect to the Proposal and the Enactment of Laws by Popular Vote of the
People of the United States, 1977: Hearings on S.J. Res. 67 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 9-11 (1977) (intro-
duced by Sen. Abourezk); L. BERG., H. HAHN & J. SCHMIDHAUSER, CORRUPTION IN THE AMER-
ICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (1976) [hereinafter cited as L. BERG].
8. In California, proponents and opponents of the state's various ballot propositions
spent over $36 million between 1972 and 1978. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 149 (Table 8.2).
By way of comparison, this amount was more money than supporters contributed to either
of the major presidential candidates for general election campaigns nationwide in 1976 and
1980. In 1978, tobacco companies spent over $7 million in California to defeat a "Clean
Indoor Air" proposition that would have restricted smoking in enclosed public places. This
amount of money exceeded the combined expenditures of all gubernatorial candidates in
California that same year. Four major tobacco companies and their trade association spent
ninety-eight percent of the $6,411,318 spent in opposition. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COM-
MISSION, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION AND SPENDING REPORT, NOVEMBER 7, 1978 GENERAL ELEC-
TION, G-5-7, A-4 (2d printing 1979).
In 1982, campaigners spent a record $35 million on petition drives and campaigns for
and against initiatives in the primary and general elections in California alone-where they
set a new national record on a single ballot proposal by spending $9.9 million on the Hand-
gun Control initiative. Initiative News Report, Apr. 8, 1983, at 6.
Although the magnitude of campaign spending on propositions was perhaps most dra-
matic in California, this phenomenon has occurred throughout the country. Inflation, how-
ever, was partially responsible for this increase in spending. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at
app. e; Initiative News Report, Apr. 8, 1983 at 6. In 1980, for example, both Montana and
Colorado also broke their state records for the total amount of money spent on ballot pro-
positions in a single year. M. Males, Expenditures on 1980 Montana Ballot Issues, (1980)
(mimeograph on file with the author); 1980 COLORADO CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT SUMMARY OF
CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES 32 (Sept. 17, 1981). In the previous year, Consolidated
Edison contributed over $1.2 million to defeat a public power measure in Westchester
County, New York, thus setting the all-time spending record on a county-level proposal. S.
Lydenberg, Bankrolling Ballots: Update 1979, at 2-3 (1980) (Council on Economic
Priorities).
9. For example, tobacco companies feared that restrictions on smoking in enclosed pub-
lic places would lead to reduced smoking. If each American smoker smoked only one less
cigarette a day, the tobacco industry would lose an estimated $450 million a year. St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Oct. 1, 1978, at C3, col. 1. In view of this projected loss, spending over six
million dollars to stop California, which contains more than one-tenth of the American pop-
[Vol. 39:377
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The amount of money spent also has led to the fear that ballot
proposition campaigns might be "bought" in much the same man-
ner as seems to be the case with some candidate-centered cam-
paigns. This fear, in turn, has prompted many states and munici-
palities to include ballot issues in their campaign finance reform
legislation. States have made various efforts to prohibit corpora-
tions from donating to ballot issue campaigns, to limit ballot cam-
paign expenditures, and to limit the amount of contributions that
a campaign could accept from any one individual or corporation.'
These legislative efforts set the stage for the resulting clash with
the Supreme Court.
II. CORRUPTION, UNDUE INFLUENCE, AND DECLINING VOTER
CONFIDENCE
The Supreme Court of the United States has set stringent pa-
rameters on campaign finance reform legislation by the manner in
which it has chosen to frame the constitutional questions
presented by legislative reform. By viewing money as speech,
rather than as speech-related conduct, 1 the Court has subjected
ulace, from adopting an ordinance restricting smoking was economically reasonable. Simi-
larly, in 1980, Standard Oil of California contributed almost one million dollars to defeat a
single state initiative that would have increased the company's taxes by perhaps as much as
$75 million a year. Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1980, Part I, at 3, col. 6. Again, such spend-
ing was a prudent, sensible way to protect livelihood and profits.
Analysts have done only a small amount of work comparing lobbying expenses with
ballot proposition financing. Overall, lobbyists have spent an estimated one billion dollars a
year lobbying Congress, with another billion spent lobbying elsewhere. 112 TIME 14, Aug. 7,
1978. Lowenstein, Forecast from Lowenstein: Campaign Finance Scandals Ahead, CAL. J.,
Mar. 1978, at 103-05, compares lobbying expenses with campaign contributions in California
in 1976. Although companies generally spend more money on lobbying than on either candi-
date elections or ballot propositions, they sometimes exceed their lobbying expenses for the
year. See S. Lydenberg, Bankrolling Ballots: Update 1980, at 19-22 (1981) (Council on Eco-
nomic Priorities).
10. California voters adopted, via an initiative, a unique proposal preventing either side
from spending more than one-half million dollars above the amount being spent by the
other side. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85303(b) (West 1975) (repealed 1977).
11. The Court in Buckley expressed the best overall statement of this view: "it is be-
yond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged 'conduct' of giving or spending
money 'arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct
is itself thought to be harmful.'" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (citation omitted).
The Court further noted: "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and
the size of the audience reached." Id. at 19. This view, however, is not unanimously held.
See, e.g., Judge Wright's response to being overruled, in Wright, Money and the Pollution
of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
609 (1982); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE LJ. 1001
19851
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
campaign finance laws to strict scrutiny;12 in the process, it often
has found the legislation an infringement upon free speech. Al-
though it is difficult to identify a coherent, overall rationale in the
Court's campaign finance opinions, the Court certainly has ignored
and perhaps rejected one of the primary historical reasons for cam-
paign finance reform: greater equality in campaigns."3
For example, the majority in Buckley v. Valeo1 held that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the first amendment ...."I" By so ruling, the
majority overturned much of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals's opinion in Buckley. Noting the disparity of wealth, the
Court of Appeals sympathized with the goal of equalizing political
influence:
It would be strange indeed if, by extrapolation outward
from the basic rights of individuals, the wealthy few could claim
a constitutional guarantee to a stronger political voice than the
unwealthy many because they are unable to give and spend
more money, and because the amounts they give and spend can-
not be limited. 6
(1976).
12. "In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental 'action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest
scrutiny.'" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (citation omitted); see also First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (state must show a compelling interest).
13. There has been some disagreement over whether the Court has been actively un-
sympathetic to the goal of equality in campaign finance-no doubt in part because the jus-
tices themselves seem to disagree. Compare L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION LAW § 16-26
(1978) (arguing that the court is basically hostile to the idea of equality in campaign finance
reform); Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the Federal Restrictions on Corporate and
Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 945 (1980) (arguing
same); Shockley, supra note 1 (arguing same); Note, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City
of Berkeley: Constitutionality of Limits on Contributions in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1001 (1981) (arguing same) [hereinafter cited as Limits on Contributions]
with Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 303 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that equality, although perhaps demoted as an issue to quid pro quo
corruption, has not been excluded as a legitimate governmental objective in the conduct of
campaigns); Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience,
Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 587 n.305, 588-90
(1982) (arguing same); Note, Equalizing Candidates' Opportunities for Expression, 51 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 113, 114-15 (1982) (arguing same) [hereinafter cited as Equalizing Candi-
dates' Opportunities]. One writer noted that, "the government can constitutionally promote
equality only by multiplying and improving opportunities for disadvantaged candidates to
express their views." Equalizing Candidates' Opportunities, supra note 13, at 115.
14. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
15. Id. at 48-49.
16. 519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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By viewing campaign funding as speech and in turn demoting
equality as a proper goal in political campaigns, the Supreme
Court has affected significantly both issue elections and candidate
elections, though in different ways. In its review of legislative re-
form of campaign funding, the Court has held that it only will al-
low statutes aimed at securing the goals of "preserving the integ-
rity of the electoral process"17 and "individual citizen's confidence
in government""8 by preventing both (1) "reality or appearance of
corruption"'" and (2) "undue influence '20 in the electoral process.
Because of this narrow approach, determining precisely what the
Supreme Court has meant by these terms is critical. Yet, an exami-
nation of the Court's use of these terms reveals narrowness of in-
terpretation and confusion over meaning.
A. Corruption
In marked contrast to earlier rulings, the modern Court now
views the reality and appearance of corruption as solely an individ-
ual candidate problem rather than a systemic problem.2 In First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,2 2 the Court naively explained
that "[t]he risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candi-
date elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a
public issue. ' 23 Although many legal scholars and political analysts
17. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978).
18. Id. at 789.
19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48.
20. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
21. In Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), a case that tested the power of
Congress to require certain political committees involved in presidential elections to issue
financial reports, the court broadly declared: "To say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to
influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protec-
tion." Id. at 545 (emphasis added). See generally United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567
(1957) (upholding a statute proscribing the expenditure of union dues to pay for campaign
advertising); Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 904 app. (1976) (brief history of federal elec-
tion regulation); H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS, ch.2 (2d ed. 1980) (reviewing the his-
tory of campaign finance reform); Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 363 (1972) (noting that prior to 1932, "'corrupt practices' had long
been a phrase of art, not limited to bribery or undue influence-which a dictionary might
suggest-but directly applicable to contributions excessive in amount or from a forbidden
source").
22. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
23. Id. at 790 (citations and note omitted); see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying
text. The Court in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297
(1981) (quoting Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1980)) noted:
"'The sole governmental interest that the Supreme Court recognized as a justification for
restricting contributions was the prevention of quid pro quo corruption between a contribu-
1985]
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forcefully argue that the Court's definition of corruption should in-
clude the systemic view that financial power fosters unchecked or
unaccountable influence in any electoral setting, a majority on the
Supreme Court still adheres to the restrictive definition." Because
the Court's view of corruption (sometimes referred to as quid pro
quo corruption) does not account for the systemic dangers of finan-
cial power, it ignores the dynamics of modern politics.
By contrast, the city of San Francisco, in defending its contri-
bution limitation on ballot propositions, more realistically defined
political corruption. Citing Webster's New International Diction-
ary, which defines corruption as "decay, decomposition or putre-
faction," the city concluded that "corruption embraces more than
the compromising of public officials. '2' The city argued that un-
restricted campaign contributions on ballot measures "[create] the
conviction in the minds of the electorate that the democratic
processes have been perverted, thereby impairing ... the concept
of direct democracy. ''26
The Supreme Court's narrow definition of corruption also be-
lies the views of many political leaders and commentators. For in-
stance, Tom McCall, former governor of Oregon, has charged that
on the issue of mandatory deposits, the beverage industry "bought
the . . . elections by flooding the mass media with a mess of lies
and distortions of the truth. '1 7 He has argued that "if limits aren't
placed on industry's spending, they will continue to buy out minds
of voters .... Perhaps the confusion is due to the Court's fail-
tor and a candidate.'"
24. For an excellent discussion of contrasting views on the meaning of corruption, see
L. BERG, supra note 7, at 3, 7 (Rather than limiting the definition of political corruption to
direct bribes and personal greed, it also must include "fundamental or systemic corrupting
influences within existing institutions," and activity that "violates and undermines the
norms of the system of public order which is deemed indispensable for the maintenance of
political democracy."); see also Nicholson, supra note 13, at 989 (blending the notion of
corruption with undue influence); Note, Preventing Corruption in the Electoral Process:
The California Supreme Court Expands the Buckley v. Valeo Analysis of Campaign Fi-
nance Regulations to Non-Candidate Elections, 3 WHrrIER L. REv. 431, 449-51 (1981) (not-
ing that the Supreme Court's definition of corruption as only "political debt" by "corrupt
politicians" ignores the far broader dictionary definitions and that the judiciary's narrow
definition has been examined in adversary proceedings).
25. Amicus Curiae Brief for the City and County of San Francisco, at 15, Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
26. Id. at 16. San Francisco's evidence for this charge consisted of statements by a vari-
ety of citizens, including those who had worked on municipal ballot proposition campaigns
and had seen the discouragement and disillusion of supporters when faced with powerful
financial opposition.
27. Cahn, Buying the Voters' Minds, AUDUBON, Jan. 1980, at 105.
28. Id. at 112; see also Beverage Container Reuse and Recycling Act of 1979; Hearings
[Vol. 39:377
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ure to recognizing that people vote on ideas; just as false advertis-
ing can influence people to buy a particular product, it also can
affect voters' electoral decisions.29 To create a definition of corrup-
tion that functionally recognizes its existence in candidate elec-
tions and not ballot proposals requires a peculiar view of the
term-one that only accounts for improper influence upon office-
holders and candidates, but not upon voters.30
Even if one accepts the narrow, quid pro quo view of corrup-
tion that is concerned only with the personal cupidity of corrupt
officeholders, ballot propositions, nonetheless, have involved the
reality or appearance of bribes, extortion, and personal greed. A
number of ballot issues directly affect the political futures of can-
didates; an obvious example is referenda on whether officeholders
can succeed themselves in office. Contributions to a referendum
campaign allowing a governor to seek reelection are really no dif-
ferent from contributions to the governor's reelection campaign.
Yet, in the first instance, the Court has stated that the risk of cor-
ruption "simply is not present," while in the second, it acknowl-
edges that it is.3 '
on S. 50 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 8-12 (1980); R. Anderson, The Ohio Alliance for Returnables: A Single Issue
Group in Action (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Convention,
Chicago, April 24-26, 1980) (discussing elections on mandatory deposits in Ohio).
29. The Supreme Court has accorded greater constitutional protection for free speech
to political advertising than to commercial advertising: "[Tihere can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the pub-
lic about lawful activity." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). Yet, many voters seem to assume that because "com-
mercial advertising is subject to some requirements of truthfulness the same must be true of
political advertising." Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 563 n.226. For an attempt at protecting
voters from falsehoods in ballot proposition campaigns, see infra, Part V.
30. Professor Daniel Lowenstein has argued that even if one acknowledges the Court's
definition of corruption and concedes that such corruption cannot occur in ballot proposi-
tion campaigns, indirect quid pro quo corruption nonetheless occurs. He has said, "The ini-
tiative is intended to reduce corrupt influence in the legislature by creating an alternative
means of passing laws. If the initiative works well it will force special interests to settle for
less in the legislature, lest they be trumpted by the voters. If the special interests have an
effective veto over initiatives, then this restraining influence in the legislature is removed. In
this sense, large contributions in ballot measure elections do pose a danger. . . . The danger
is indirect but it fits within the narrow sense of quid pro quo corruption, which is given freer
reign in the legislature." Letter from Professor Daniel Lowenstein to Professor John S.
Shockley (discussing corrupt influences on the initiative process).
31. As merely one example, in the 1981 vote on whether to allow the governor of Ken-
tucky to seek reelection, statewide proponents of the then-current governor's position out-
spent foes by a fourteen-to-one margin, and eleven large corporations, some of whom were
headed by close personal friends of the governor, contributed over $10,000 each to the effort.
Louisville Courier-Journal, Dec. 8, 1981, at 1. Allegations of threats to enforce the fund-
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Similarly, candidates can ride into office on the coattails of
ballot proposition issues.32 One way to gain favor with a political
candidate may be to contribute heavily to a proposition that he
actively supports or even upon which he may be staking his career.
In other words, ballot proposition campaigns can create political
debts.33 It is not unknown for a politician to campaign actively in
support of a ballot proposition favored by a powerful financial in-
terest with whom he later accepts employment.34 Are political
debts being rewarded? Is a politician being "bought?"
In Schwarz v. Romnes,3 5 the first modern court case to address
these issues, 6 the majority and dissent differed on the possibility
raising effort also surfaced. Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 7, 1982, at D1. Whether such
allegations were true or not in this particular instance is beside the central point being made
here-that ballot propositions undoubtedly can involve the reality and the appearance of
corruption-even under the Court's narrow definition of the term.
32. Amicus Curiae Brief for the City of Santa Monica at 3, Citizens Against Rent Con-
trol v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
33. Some might argue that this situation is sufficiently infrequent to allow for limiting
contributions on all ballot proposition campaigns. But we do not know how often this oc-
curs, and the Court has said that it is interested not only in eliminating corruption but the
appearance of corruption as well. Defenders of Court policy might also argue that this dis-
tinction is too complex for the Court to handle. But see infra note 42 (concerning CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)).
34. Confidential Interview with a government official in the State of Michigan (Spring,
1984). Also, how is one to understand the following political event:
The Los Angeles Times reported on 11/13/82 that California State Assembly
Speaker Willie Brown offered to include a "No" endorsement of the Handgun
Control Initiative in a slate mailing to the state's Democrats, if opponents of the
initiative paid $75,000. After the offer was rejected, party leaders made an en-
dorsement overture to proponents. "Yes on 15" [sic] spokesperson Victor Pal-
mieri said he discussed a cost of between $35,000 and $40,000 for the endorse-
ment, but declined because "We just didn't have the money." Opponents of the
Water Resources and Beverage Container Deposit Initiatives . . .paid $30,000
each for a "Vote No" position in the mailing to 1.5 million of the state's
Democrats.
The mailing took no position on the Gun Initiative, and Brown denied any
knowledge of offers to either side in that campaign. But prominent Democrats
have criticized Brown and State Democratic Chairwoman Nancy Pelosi for ac-
cepting a total of $75,000 from ballot measure committees promoting positions
not approved by the state party's central committee.
Initiative News Report, Dec. 1, 1982, at 1.
35. 495 F.2d 844 (2nd Cir. 1974); see Comment, The Constitutionality of Limitations
on Corporate Contributions to Ballot Measure Campaigns, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 145, 167-68;
Note, supra note 24, at 442-44.
36. Earlier court cases from the Progressive Era addressed this question. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.W. 195 (1916) (upholding the conviction of a director
of a corporation for contributing corporate funds to a ballot proposition committee in viola-
tion of a state statute regulating and limiting election expenses). This emphasizes the point
that the Burger Court's views on campaign finance have not been in keeping with the tradi-
tion of American law on the subject. See supra note 21.
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of questionable motivations underlying contributions to ballot pro-
positions. A two-man majority on the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit argued that "[w]hatever the justifica-
tion for prohibiting contributions that are prone to create political
debts, it largely evaporates when the object of prohibition is not
contributions to a candidate or party, but contributions to a public
referendum. '37 The dissent by Judge Mulligan, however, raised
disturbing issues:
While the appellants urged that their contribution was moti-
vated by their interest in good highways which are essential to
the operation of their business, the position of the appellees
seems to be that the motivation ... was to curry favor with the
Governor, who was totally devoted to the passage of the proposi-
tion and whose Appointments Secretary resigned to head up
[the bond issue campaign]. They find it sinister that the three
identified public utility donors were in the same year seeking
rate increases from the Public Service Commission whose mem-
bers are appointed by the Governor.38
Although Mulligan did not assess the accuracy of these charges, he
emphasized: "It is the opportunity for abuse created by the contri-
bution which the [New York State] statute seeks to avoid. ' 39
Perhaps the Supreme Court of the United States chose to
adopt the narrow quid pro quo definition of corruption because a
broader definition would force the Court to abandon its candidate/
issue dichotomy and, in turn, compel the Court to discontinue its
approval of the actions of monied interests in ballot proposition
campaigns.4 0 The knowledge that the prevention of corruption (a
goal that the Court recognizes as constitutionally permissible) and
the equalizing of access to all citizens (a goal for which the Court
has expressed considerable distaste) are distinguished from each
other primarily by degree may have further troubled the Court:
"Both seek to remedy the danger of an elected official or policy
that represents the will of a few large contributors rather than the
will of a majority of the electorate.""1 Any definition broader than
37. Schwarz, 495 F.2d at 852-53 (footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 857 n.3.
39. Id. Judge Mulligan also noted that although the majority recognized that public
disclosure of funding minimized the risk that the public would "'be misled as to the source
or inspiration of corporate-financed views,' it [was] significant that [the proponents' com-
mittee had] not reported or disclosed the sources of its income and [had] successfully re-
sisted legal action seeking to obtain this information." Id.
40. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
41. Limits on Contributions, supra note 13, at 1016. Of course it is true that many laws
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the Court's quid pro quo view of corruption might have led the
Court down a slippery slope. Thus, by ignoring these similarities,
the Court often has erected what is an artificial distinction be-
tween ballot propositions and candidate elections.
B. Undue Influence
Although the Court's concept of corruption appears to be po-
litically naive,42 the individual candidate quid pro quo definition is
at least reasonably clear, even though it fails to acknowledge the
varieties of corruption to which both officeholders and voters are
subject. The Court's treatment of undue influence, however, is
more confused. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the
first case that the Burger Court considered involving the permissi-
ble restraints on the financing of ballot issue campaigns, 3 the ma-
jority stated that if evidence demonstrated that "corporate advo-
cacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes,
thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment inter-
involve distinctions of degree rather than of kind, with the actual point at which the divi-
sion is made often somewhat arbitrary.
For another approach to this combination of similarity and difference in candidate and
ballot proposition corruption, see Note, All the Free Speech That Money Can Buy: Monop-
olization of Issue Perception in Referendum Campaigns, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157 (1980).
The author adopts the Court's narrow definition but argues that large expenditures of
money may mean corruption in candidate campaigns and may mean control of issue percep-
tion in ballot proposition campaigns.
[Tihe potential to control issue perception does not as clearly threaten our dem-
ocratic ideals as does corruption in office .... Just as the political quid pro quo
can threaten the independence of the elected decisionmaker, so can the control
of issue perception through monopoly or saturation of the media potentially
threaten the independence of the voter decisionmaker.
Id. at 161-62. For a related example of the control of issue perception, see infra note 71.
42. The Court is not naive about the impact of money in other cases. See CBS v. Dem-
ocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973) (where Chief Justice Burger expressed concern
over media access "so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent, or those with
access to wealth"); see also Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup.
CT. REV. 243, 275 n.104 (finding considerable irony in the Supreme Court's choice of lan-
guage); Wright, supra note 11, at 630-31 (same).
43. In Bellotti, two national banking associations and three business corporations chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that prohibited them from contrib-
uting to ballot issue campaigns not materially affecting property, business, or assets of the
corporation. 435 U.S. at 767-68. For a discussion of the case and much of the commentary,
see Fox, Corporate Political Speech: The Effect of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
Upon Statutory Limitations on Corporate Referendum Spending, 67 Ky. L.J. 75 (1978-79);
Kiley, PACing the Burger Court: The Corporate Right to Speak and the Public Right to
Hear after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 427 (1980); Shockley, supra note
1, at 700-06.
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ests, these arguments would merit our consideration."" The major-
ity further explained, however, that the State of Massachusetts
had failed to show that "the relative voice of corporations has been
overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Mas-
sachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of
the citizenry in government. '45
Such statements seem to indicate that evidence that big
money is "overwhelming" or "significant" in ballot proposition
campaigns would critically affect the Court's decision. In the next
paragraph of the opinion, however, the Court receded from that
interpretation: "[C]orporate advertising may influence the outcome
of the vote. That would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy
may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it ..
" .4' The Court thus engaged in an apparent contradiction over
whether evidence on the influence of money in ballot proposition
campaigns would be compelling in its determination.47
Neither the judiciary in general nor the Supreme Court in par-
ticular has distinguished between what is undue influence and
48what is effective persuasion. Even if the Court were to recognize
that big spending plays a critical role in the success or defeat of a
number of ballot measures, the Court's analysis suggests that it
merely would deem this "effective persuasion" by those who care
enough to spend money to educate voters about their own sincerely
held point of view.
The Court's distinction between domination and legitimate
persuasion probably hinges on perception. In other words, only if
voters perceive big money as dominating the process, thereby
44. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
45. Id. at 789-90.
46. Id. at 790.
47. For a further discussion on this issue, see Nicholson, The Constitutionality of Con-
tribution Limitations in Ballot Measure Elections, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 683, 703-05 (1980-81);
Nicholson, supra note 13, at 995-96; Limits on Contributions, supra note 13, at 1005, 1016-
17.
48. Professor Easley states that, "from the point of view of government, there can re-
ally be no such thing as 'undue' persuasion ...." Easley, Buying Back the First Amend-
ment: Regulation of Disproportionate Corporate Spending in Ballot Issue Campaigns, 17
GA. L. REv. 675, 738-39 (1983). He further comments that, "[flor government to detect un-
due persuasion, it would have to decide that someone was succeeding more than he should.
That in turn, though, requires that government be permitted to determine that someone
else should be winning instead. That prospect is totally inconsistent with the 'free market'
conception of the first amendment." Id. at 739 n.328. But is campaign finance reform any
more inconsistent with the free market than the Sherman Antitrust Act? Professor Easley,
however, detects the ideological undercurrents that are causing the swirling confusion and
inconsistencies in the Court's opinions.
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alienating citizens, reducing voter turnout, and undermining the
democratic process, should campaign finance reform curb such in-
fluence."9 Requiring a public perception of domination adds a sec-
ond stage to the process, complicating the matter considerably. If
the public were to recognize the overwhelming impact of campaign
funds on direct democracy, would money simultaneously become
less influential, as in a self-negating prophecy? What if the public
does not perceive money as being dominant, but it is? Or, less
likely, what if the public perceives money as being dominant, but
the public is wrong?50 On this question of perception, is it not rele-
vant that so many states and municipalities-often through direct
voter approval of the specific laws-have tried to limit money in
ballot proposition campaigns? 5' Is this an indication that the pub-
lic already perceives and understands the power of money to domi-
nate the electoral process? For what other purposes would these
states enact such laws?5 2 Unfortunately, the Court has chosen not
to answer these questions.
The Supreme Court's curious narrowing of the concept of cor-
ruption and leaving unclear the meaning or even the possibility of
undue influence has been crucial to the Court's decisions. In addi-
tion, by downgrading the goal of equality in the campaign process
and viewing money as a form of speech (entitled to constitutional
protection), the Supreme Court has deleteriously affected the pro-
motion of direct democracy through campaign finance reform.
49. In his partial dissent in Buckley, Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that "the per-
ception that personal wealth wins elections may not only discourage potential candidates
without significant personal wealth from entering the political arena, but also undermines
public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 288
(1975) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. See Nicholson, supra note 47, at 708-10. The question of public perception forces
one to look at the sociological area of reputational power analysis. If the public attributes
power to certain people or forces, these people or forces are likely to become more powerful
from being perceived as powerful: "thinking may make it so."
51. That so many campaign finance reform measures become enacted via the initiative
process is an indication that people are concerned about the corrupt influence of money in
politics. Elected representatives often tend to be more accommodating to special interests.
52. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Mervin Field poll of
California voters on their perception of the influence of money spent on ballot issue cam-
paigns). Another example of this theory is reflected in a study of restrictions in Connecticut
on corporate spending in ballot proposition campaigns. Maloney, From Marketplace to Bal-
lot Box: The Corporate Assertion of Political Power, 12 CONN. L. REV. 14, 56 n.146 (1979-
80). Maloney concluded that "it is clear that the fear of such potential influence was the
motivating force behind the enactment of the legislation." Id. Maloney notes that there was
no debate on the point, and the bill "passed without significant questions being raised." Id.
(citing 20 Conn. H.R. Proc., pt. 4, 1977 Sess. 1447-52 (Apr. 14, 1977)).
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III. EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF MONEY ON BALLOT
PROPOSITION CAMPAIGNS
The judiciary's activism on campaign finance reform has
forced legislators and scholars to adapt or respond to the courts by
giving more weight to their concerns and less to those arguments
the judiciary does not consider persuasive. Although some states
and municipalities have made persistent attempts to implement
reform, complaints about the influence of big money have
continued."
Ultimately, one must consider whether money is important in
ballot proposition campaigns.5 4 If money is unimportant or only
marginally important, then the Court's rulings may not have had
much impact upon the process of direct democracy. If money is
decisive, then direct democracy is severely weakened in its justifi-
cation as a means whereby ordinary citizens can write and approve
their own laws, thereby bypassing the normal political process
where entrenched special interests and corruption may have
accrued.
A. The Best Currently Available Evidence
Amassing evidence on the role of money in ballot proposition
campaigns has been a fairly recent phenomenon. The task is made
53. Boston tried to respond to private wealth by using municipal funds, but the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied the city that right. Anderson v. City of Bos-
ton, 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979). States
that have fought judicial battles over trying to restrict the use of money in ballot proposi-
tion campaigns include: CALIFORNIA: Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Prac-
tices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547 P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976); MONTANA: C & C
Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978); FLORIDA: Let's Help Florida v.
McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980); MASSACHUSETTS: First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 455 U.S. 765 (1978). All of these states have lost. Other states have had to change
their laws in response to these decisions. Michigan appears to be the only state left that is
actively trying to enforce its campaign finance reform laws on ballot propositions. See infra
text accompanying notes 135-41.
54. Of course, those individuals, corporations, unions, professional associations, and va-
rious other interests would not spend so much money on ballot proposition campaigns if
they did not think it likely to be effective, nor, it can be surmised, would monied interests so
vigorously challenge state and municipal campaign finance laws. A certain irony exists in
monied interests challenging laws regulating the expenditure of money in campaigns when
simultaneously they argue that the expenditure of money is not all that important to a
campaign. See Mueller & Parrinello, The Constitutionality of Limits on Ballot Measure
Contributions, 57 N.D.L. REv. 391 (1981). When the government has spent sums on ballot
propositions, opponents, even if wealthy, have been known suddenly to argue that the gov-
ernment expenditure will cause them "irreparable injury." See, e.g., Mountain States Legal
Found. v. Denver School Dist., 459 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978).
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more difficult, both because most states have had inadequate or
nonexistent disclosure statutes until fairly recently,55 and because,
as in candidate campaigns, money is only one potential factor in
the success or defeat of proposals. 6 What political commentator
Alexander Heard said over twenty years ago regarding campaign
money in elections is still true:
[There is] no neat correlation . . . between campaign expendi-
tures and campaign results. Even if superiority in expenditures
and success at the polls always ran together, the flow of funds
• . . might simply reflect . . . prior popular appeal rather than
create it. Our understanding of voting behavior is not so precise
that all the financial and non-financial factors that contribute to
success can be sorted out with confidence. Yet it is clear that
under some conditions the use of funds can be decisive. And
under others, no amount of money spent . . . could alter the
outcome .. .
55. Several states still have no disclosure statutes; these states include Arkansas, Ne-
vada, North Dakota, and Utah. Draft Petition before the SEC, filed on behalf of the Council
on Economic Priorities, petition for an Amendment of Rule 14a-3 to Provide for Disclosure
of Corporate Expenditures in Ballot Question Campaigns (June 15, 1982) (on file with the
author). Arizona only recently required disclosure on contributions and expenditures on bal-
lot measures. Initiative News Report, Aug. 23, 1982, at 8.
56. A related but distinct question concerns the impact of mass media advertising on
ballot proposition campaigns. Because nearly all heavily funded campaigns make extensive
use of the media, the questions of the impact of money and media advertising often merge.
Recently, however, several expensive campaigns have avoided use of mass media advertising,
probably to avoid granting opponents the right to reply under the fairness doctrine. See
infra Part V.
As one would expect, judging the impact of mass media on campaigns raises many of
the same problems as measuring the impact of money on campaigns. For a good summary of
the complexity of the issues involved and the difficulty of measuring its impact, see Nimmo,
Mass Communications and Politics, in 4 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 241 (S. Long ed.
1981). He argues that scholars should move away from the either/or mentality of media
influence to a consideration of the possible varieties of impact. Scholars, he continues,
should neither study communicators or audiences in isolation nor limit the study of impact
to individuals but should instead examine the impact upon institutions and political opinion
leaders as well. This requires devising better instruments for measuring "media susceptibil-
ity" and "media impact." Nimmo concludes that "the role of mass communication in influ-
encing individual political behavior, so readily dismissed as minimal in early studies, is now
being taken very seriously." Id. at 280.
57. A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 16 (1960). With renewed emphasis on cam-
paign finance reform in the last decade, analysts have placed more emphasis on the role of
campaign financing in candidate elections and have made some fairly sophisticated attempts
to isolate its impact on campaigns. For example, in trying to isolate the influence of parti-
sanship, incumbency, and money on congressional campaigns, one commentator found that
the expenditure of money makes a difference, although it was far more helpful to challeng-
ers than incumbents. G. JACOBSEN, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980) For a cri-
tique of the model that Jacobsen uses to measure the influence of money, see Welch, Money
and Votes: A Simultaneous Equation Model, in 36 PUB. CHOICE 209 (1981). Although con-
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Nevertheless, certain general tendencies have been found.
Across different times and locations, money has been much more
successful in defeating ballot proposals than in insuring their suc-
cess. Numerous scholars have found that it is easier to use money
to cast doubts on ballot measures than to get citizens to vote af-
firmatively. Using money to try to convince voters to support a
particular proposition may be more easily portrayed as benefiting a
particular special interest." As an example of these general ten-
dencies, in the twenty-eight year period from 1954 to 1982 in Cali-
fornia, only one initiative has been able to withstand overwhelming
monied opposition.5 9 Yet, of the twenty-two ballot propositions
where the affirmative campaigners spent considerably more money
than the negative, only eight were successful.60 Through examining
polling results for the 1954 to 1978 period, David Magleby has
found that significant shifts in voter opinion were three times as
likely to occur with ballot proposals (46% of the time) as with can-
didate elections (15% of the time)."' These results tend to substan-
tiate the claims of others that money is all the more influential on
ballot proposals because voters do not have the orienting devices of
party labels or name familarity when they vote.6 2 In addition, be-
siderable debate exists over how to measure money's impact on political campaigns, no one
has suggested that money is not extremely important in determining who wins and who
loses.
58. Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 563-70, has explored this phenomenon the most
carefully.
59. Opponents have defeated thirteen of fourteen initiatives . Both Lowenstein, supra
note 13, and D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 147-48, have examined many of these campaigns.
For the 1982 results, see Initiative News Report, Nov. 12, 1982, at 1-8. The Coastal Zone
Initiative, Proposition 20 in 1972, was the only recent initiative to survive heavy opposition
spending. Commentators Lutrin and Settle examined the success of this proposition in the
face of financial opposition. Lutrin & Settle, The Public and Ecology: The Role of Initia-
tives in California's Environmental Politics, 28 W. POL. Q. 352 (1975). Professor Lowenstein
advances a convincing and disturbing reason for its success. See Lowenstein, supra note 13,
at 532. From examining polling data and expenditures during the campaign, Lowenstein
ironically argues that, among other reasons, Proposition 20 passed because opponents did
not spend enough money to defeat it.
60. A success rate of 36% (8 of 22) is actually higher than the overall initiative success
rate of 31% for this period. The criteria for heavy, one-sided spending is at least double the
amount of the opponent's expenditures, with total campaign expenditures of at least
$100,000 in 1958 (almost $400,000 in 1982). For the raw data, see D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4,
app. E.
61. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 298.
62. See J. Shockley, The Initiative Process in Colorado Politics: An Assessment (1980)
(Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of Colorado, Boulder). For an-
other study that focuses upon media impact in three of the same initiative campaigns
Shockley discusses, see Mastro, Costlow, & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Con-
trol of the Referendum Process Through Media Spending and What To Do About It, 32
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cause some issues present problems of great complexity, or because
some issues (especially those seeking repeal of a law) can require
one to vote against the proposition in order to retain the law,6 the
possibility of confusion increases the use of deception. 4 Such a
phenomenon leads to an irony in judicial policy. Big money contri-
butions can be prohibited in candidate elections, where they may
have less influence on the voters, but cannot be prohibited on bal-
lot propositions, where they appear to be more influential. 5
Steven Lydenberg's studies of ballot proposals around the
country in 1978, 1979, and 1980 indicate that where the corporate
side spent considerably more money to defeat ballot measures than
the proponents had spent, the corporate side was successful eighty-
one percent of the time, or twenty-five out of thirty-two times."6
His evidence also shows that the side spending the most
money-whether pro or con and from whatever source-won
twenty-nine of the thirty-nine contests in this three-year period
from 1978 through 1980.67
FED. COMM. L.J. 315 (1980).
63. For example, on a measure to repeal a state's equal rights amendment, a vote
against the effort is a vote to support the ERA. Magleby discusses voter confusion on the
tax measure that resulted in the Bellotti case, noting that lower income and less educated
voters were more likely to vote against their stated preferences. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4,
Ch. 5. In their study of the 1976 nuclear safety initiative in California, D. Hensler and C.
Hensler have also examined and found some voter confusion over whether a vote in favor of
a nuclear safety proposal meant supporting greater or less use of nuclear energy. D. HEN-
SLER & C. HENSLER, EVALUATING NUCLEAR POWER: VOTER CHOICE ON THE NUCLEAR ENERGY
INITIATIVE, Section V (1979).
64. Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 519-26, 563 describes some blatantly deceptive cam-
paign tactics, a strategy that he labels "reversal tactics."
65. The disparity in ballot proposition spending also tends to be much greater than in
candidate races; in part, this is one of the results of the Bellotti decision. Lowenstein, supra
note 13, at 589.
66. Lydenberg, supra note 9; Lydenberg, supra note 8; S. Lydenberg, Bankrolling Bal-
lots: The Role of Business in Financing State Ballot Question Campaigns (1979) (Council on
Economic Priorities). In these works Lydenberg also details the campaigns, providing valua-
ble information on the strategies, arguments, and the sources of funds in the campaigns.
67. In his most recent work, Lydenberg found the same phenomena:
The 1982 election reconfirmed the powerful role corporate funds can play in ini-
tiative and referenda campaigns. An examination of eighteen ballot question
campaigns around the country which pitted business interests against citizens or
grassroots groups shows that business spending dominated sixteen of the eigh-
teen campaigns-and that the side with business backing won in thirteen of
these sixteen campaigns. In both cases where the business-backed side did not
outspend its opponents, it lost.
Lydenberg, Business Big Spenders Hit the Referenda Votes, 47 Bus. Soc'v REV. 53-55 (Fall
1983). Analysts for the Initiative News Report found in studying all initiatives in 1980 and
1981 that on all measures where significant one-sided spending occurred, "the bigger spend-
ers won 15 of 25, or 60% ," and on issues where the significant one-sided spending was on
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In many of these campaigns, the impact of money seems to
have been crucial to the outcome of the vote. Either polls showed
the measures far ahead until enormous opposition spending hit, as
in the California separate smoking sections proposals in 1978 and
1980, or polls showed the measures locked in close battle until one
side suddenly had much more money to spend, as in the Massa-
chusetts property tax classification measure.68 There were many in-
stances in California of initiatives being brought down by money.
Some were particularly painful for campaign finance reform advo-
cates because, in 1974, the state's voters had approved by an over-
whelming margin limitation of expenditures in ballot proposition
campaigns. The Supreme Court of California declared the limita-
tion unconstitutional two years later."'
Thus, when the amount of money spent against ballot mea-
sures is compared with polling data, support for propositions al-
most always declines as opposition money increases. From these
the negative side, "the better funded side won 13 of 16, or 81%." Where initiatives faced
negligible spending, 5 of 7 (71%) were approved, and where roughly equal spending oc-
curred, 3 of 5 (60%) were approved. Initiative News Report, Apr. 19, 1982, at 6 (noting as a
comparison that in the U.S. Senate races of 1980 where one candidate had a significant
spending advantage over the opponent, the monied candidate won 81% of the time). In the
1976-81 period:
[I]nitiatives characterized by one-sided pro-spending, combined with those with-
out one-sided spending, had a 50% success rate. Those with one-sided anti-initi-
ative spending, by contrast, had only a 22% success rate. This clearly suggests
that spending is an important factor in an initiative's defeat, but fails to prove it
is the most important factor in all, or even most cases of one-sided anti-initiative
spending.
Initiative News Report, May 17, 1982, at 8.
68. On the separate smoking sections initiative in California, see Lowenstein, supra
note 13, at 537-40, 631-32; Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 44-49; Lydenberg, supra note 66, at
33-34. The Massachusetts case is particularly fascinating because polls showed the measure
in a dead heat until the city of Boston was suddenly able to spend $700,000 just before the
election to counter business opposition. The measure then passed by a 64% margin.
Lydenberg, supra note 66, at 69-75. The judiciary declared unconstitutional Boston's at-
tempt to use municipal funds to counter corporate spending on initiatives. For a discussion
of the case and the issues involved, see Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy
in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1980); supra note 53. A discus-
sion of media phases of a utility campaign correlated with daily tracking of voter attitudes
toward an Ohio utility reform initiative also provides fascinating evidence of the impact of
media and money on the campaign. See Pierce, The Big Ohio Referendum War: Defeat of
an Initially Popular Initiative, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Spring 1983, at 44.
69. Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547
P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976).
For more on the law and the judicial response to the Political Reform Act of 1974, see
M. NEWQUEST, THE POLITICAL REFORM ACT OF 1974: A CASE STUDY IN CALIFORNIA'S INITIA-
TIVE PROCESS (1981).
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results, one can infer the significant influence of money.70 In addi-
tion, in their attempt to determine which tactics and arguments
are best to use in winning campaigns, numerous media organiza-
tions and advertising specialists have found that advertising cam-
paigns strongly influence voter attitudes. 7 1
Of course, even in defeating propositions, money is not always
determinative, any more than bribery is always committed in a
system where there are no laws against it, or any more than brib-
ery is always successful (a person stays bought) when it takes
place.72 Yet, because the Court seems to have placed emphasis on
the extent to which money is "significant" or "overwhelming" 7 in
ballot proposition elections, the degree and regularity of impact
70. Lowenstein, supra note 13; Lydenberg, supra note 9; Lydenberg, supra note 8;
Lydenberg, supra note 66; Mastro, supra note 62; Shockley, supra note 62; have compared
polling results to campaign expenditures over the course of campaigns. Although making no
attempt to find a relationship between spending and polling results during the campaign
period, Magleby includes appendices on these two factors. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4.
71. Scholars have had difficulty evaluating data on the impact of advertising, because
private interests generally retain these polling results. But see infra text accompanying
notes 135-41. As political consultants and media specialists become more sophisticated, they
develop new techniques and more effective ways to measure impact. These include better
designs for determining what kinds of arguments would be most useful against particular
proposals, such as asking individuals in favor of a measure how much the measure would
have to cost the government in implementation before the person would vote against it.
Depending upon the answer, the opposition then charges that the measure would cost
whatever their polling results say would be a high enough figure to turn people against the
measure, even though this is clearly false advertising. Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 538-39.
Other tactics include waiting until just after an expenditure reporting deadline to pour
money into a campaign. D. Lowenstein, Complaint filed before the California Fair Political
Practices Commission (Oct. 30, 1980) (on file with the author). For new ways to make corpo-
rate campaigns appear to be citizen based, see infra note 119. For sophisticated polling
techniques to determine the best name for a campaign committee, see infra note 151. See
also Shockley, supra note 62, at 32 (discussing a dramatic example of the impact of slo-
ganeering on the Colorado mandatory bottle deposit initiative where a post-election poll
found that forty percent of the people who voted against the initiative recited the advertis-
ing slogan against the proposal as their reason for having voted against it). A refreshingly
direct article by a leader in a successful negative campaign lays out many of the common
procedures by which campaign funding overwhelms popular initiatives: "First, early media
must be used to set the parameters of the debate over the issue and define the issue in the
public mind"-deflecting original voter "discontent away from its usual focus, the utility
industry." Daily polling tracks the effectiveness of the advertising. Id.; see Pierce, supra
note 68, at 40-45.
In those rare instances where opposition money is not successful, extensive post-elec-
tion research is often undertaken to determine why the money was not successful. See
AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, OREGON
INITIATIVE: RESULTS OF POST-ELECTION RESEARCH (1979).
72. It is worth remembering that we do not have bribery laws because we believe all
politicians and lobbyists are crooks. We have these laws because we believe that the possi-
bility, or the probability, exists and that when bribery occurs, it corrupts the process.
73. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
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appears to be crucial to the argument whether campaign finance
restrictions will be allowed. Scholars have not made the argument
that money is never determinative of ballot proposition outcomes,
but occasional studies have attempted to show that money is often
not important to the results. Once the distinction between negative
and affirmative spending is made, however, these studies lose most
or all of their explanatory force.7 '
Scholars of direct democracy have never claimed that money
is always determinative of electoral outcomes, and political ana-
lysts have noted that other considerations sometimes influence the
outcome of ballot propositions. These other factors can be reduced
to five points:75 (1) Was the money effectively spent? Did state,
local, or national people participate in the campaign? Were activ-
ists sensitive to state or local concerns? Were focus groups, panel
studies or other polling techniques used to test the "marketability"
of the campaign strategies? How competent were the pollsters and
media consultants involved in the campaign? (2) What were the
depth and breadth of coalitions for and against a ballot measure
(including the reactions of the locality's political establishment and
media endorsements)? (3) Were the issues distinctive? For exam-
ple, straighforward issues (e.g. the death penalty) may be less sus-
ceptible to the influence of money and the media than more com-
plex issues 76 (as are those issues that seek to maintain the status
74. For one study that tries to show that money is not very important in ballot proposi-
tion campaigns, see Mueller & Parrinello, supra note 54, at 415-26. The authors, members
of the law firm that represented the appellants in CARC, assert that "[m]oney spent on
ballot measures may very well influence voter behavior. Nevertheless, historical research
reveals that money alone does not dictate or explain the results of ballot measure elections."
Id. at 417-18. They could make this claim from California initiatives only by lumping affirm-
ative and negative spending together. In this manner, they were able to find that the side
spending the most money (even if very little was spent, and even if the difference between
sides was minimal) won only 54% of the time. Although their study contains several appen-
dices dealing with money in California ballot proposition campaigns, they avoid the analyti-
cal comparison that, according to other scholars, reveals the most significant evidence of the
impact of money; thus, they do not confront directly other scholarly works. Professor Easley
critiques an earlier work that tried to show that corporations do not dominate ballot pro-
position campaigns, finding that the four sources utilized in the argument "support a con-
clusion contrary to the one for which they were cited." Easley, supra note 48, at 694 n.108.
For the irony of proponents of big spending arguing that money is ineffective, see supra,
note 54.
75. See Lowenstein, supra note 13; Lutrin & Settle, supra note 59; Lydenberg, supra
note 9; Lydenberg, supra note 8; Lydenberg, supra note 66; D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4; M.
Males, Be It Enacted by the People: A Citizens' Guide to Initiatives (1981) (Northern Rock-
ies Action Group); Shockley, supra note 62.
76. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, Ch. 7.
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quo).7 (4) How were the initiatives worded on the ballot? Particu-
lar words can help determine how the public will perceive the
question and how the issues will be defined in the campaign. (5)
The placement of a particular proposition on the ballot also can be
important to its outcome. A measure sandwiched between two un-
popular proposals will tend to fare worse than one appearing at the
top of the list or alongside uncontroversial measures that are sure
to pass."8
These points indicate the variety and complexity of the influ-
ences that must be considered; they also demonstrate the difficulty
of affixing firm causality in an area where the Supreme Court de-
mands it as a precondition to legitimate governmental interest.
These nonfinancial factors, however, do not negate the effect of
money on the outcome of ballot proposals; nor does the failure of
money to decide a particular issue "mitigate the harm caused to
supporters of propositions apparently favored by a majority of vot-
ers but defeated as a result of a deceptive and substanceless one-
sided advertising campaign. ''9 Yet, because money is not always
determinative, opponents of campaign finance reform argue that it
is not a crucial or consistent enough factor to justify the restraints
that financial limits place on "free speech." This viewpoint is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's determination that it is not
enough to show money to be influential or persuasive. According to
the Court, one also must show that undue influence is undermining
the democratic process.80
Although Common Cause,8' Justice Thurgood Marshall, 2 and
others often have asserted that large expenditures erode citizen
confidence in the democratic process by giving people the impres-
sion that elections are a rich man's game, few scholarly studies
have addressed this issue. In Corruption in the Political System, 83
77. M. Males, supra note 75, at 9.
78. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 4; Shockley, supra note 62, at 18 n.4.
79. Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 546. Lowenstein further commented that, "if in cer-
tain elections the proponents (or opponents) of propositions have been overwhelmed by one-
sided spending and enough voters have been misled by deceptive campaigns to produce
'wrong' results, then it is irrelevant that in other elections under other circumstances one-
sided spending may have been unsuccessful." Paper presented by Professor Daniel Lowen-
stein, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, in New York City (Sept. 5,
1981).
80. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
81. This citizen's group has actively lobbied for campaign finance reform. See Wert-
heimer, The PAC Phenomenon in American Politics, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 603 (1980).
82. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 288 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
83. L. BERG, supra note 7.
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however, Larry Berg, Harlan Hahn, and John Schmidhauser note
that several national polls indicate that a majority of the American
people believe that: (1) large corporations have a great deal more
influence on government than the average citizen; (2) citizens have
"hardly any or almost no" influence in running the government;"'
(3) politicians are "bought off by some private interest;"8 and (4)
a majority of Americans favor laws limiting campaign
expenditures."8
Based on these results, the authors found that big money cam-
paigns have led to the public's sense of alienation from the politi-
cal process. The authors concluded that the steady decline in voter
turnout over the past two decades, seen most clearly in presiden-
tial elections, is a logical response to the growing perception that
one's vote is of no consequence.
Although this study attempts to tie all of these issues together,
the work suffers from certain weaknesses that could be used to dis-
miss the authors' conclusions. The study would be stronger if it
also considered the public's attitude toward the influence of money
on ballot propositions as well as on candidate elections.8 7 Also, if
the authors had cited individual polls that contained all these
questions, their conclusions would be more comprehensive; one
would be able to determine whether the same people who felt pow-
erless also believed that campaign expenditures should be limited,
and if these same people also were less likely to participate in the
electoral process. In short, the use of data from several different
polls makes it difficult to determine how tightly these three groups
fit together. In addition, other factors also influence the public's
sense of trust and confidence in the political process. For example,
Vietnam, Watergate, and a stagnant economy all have influenced
citizens on these issues. Yet, the study makes no attempt to deter-
mine the extent to which campaign finance practices and attitudes
have caused the American public to feel cynical toward and power-
less in the electoral process-although these feelings have in-
creased over the last two decades.88
Recently, a major polling organization has addressed, for the
first time, the systemic question of voter attitudes toward the im-
84. Id. at 47.
85. Id. at 49.
86. Id. at 48.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
88. See supra note 6.
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pact of money in elections.8 9 In 1982, the Mervin Field organiza-
tion in California found that an overwhelming eighty-two percent
of those Californians surveyed 90 agreed that "in those proposition
races where only one side of an issue has enough money to pay for
expensive campaign advertising, the outcome does not usually re-
present the will of the people but the interest of the big campaign
contributors." ' This result clearly indicates that citizens believe
that money not only is influential but is distorting and corrupting
the process by overwhelming the will of the people.
B. What Social Science Techniques Can Offer
While empirical evidence in support of the need to limit
spending in ballot proposition campaigns continues to develop,
what would a study of this question using the best social science
techniques entail? Can a definitive study be structured on the sub-
ject to determine whether, or under what circumstances, large
campaign spending on ballot measures leads to a decline in confi-
dence in the democratic process? The expectation of a definite af-
firmative answer seems too optimistic, but further research would
certainly increase our knowledge on this matter. The best attempt
to answer this question would require polling rather than aggregate
voting analysis. The polling should address questions on money in
ballot measure campaigns, not simply general questions about
money in politics. Also, the same poll would need to ask people
about their sense of political powerlessness, their confidence in the
political process, and their level of participation in politics. If the
pollsters found that those people who favored limits on contribu-
tions to ballot measure campaigns were also those who lacked con-
fidence in the process, felt powerless, and were less likely to vote,
such findings would provide a strong argument that the fears to
which the Court has alluded do exist.92 If such a study covered
89. See infra text accompanying notes 115-27.
90. The Field Institute conducted four different surveys in the fall of 1982 among an
aggregate total of 3,324 registered voters. On election day in November, the institute inter-
viewed 6,345 voters as they left the polls. FIELD INSTITUTE, CALIFORNIA OPINION INDEX (Feb.
1983).
91. Id. at 2. In response to a question on the "perceived effect of campaign spending"
on the outcome of ballot propositions, 63% thought such spending had "a great deal of
effect." Interestingly, more (73%) thought that campaign spending in candidate races had
"a great deal of effect." Id. at 3.
92. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978) (insufficient
evidence of undue influence). Even this finding, however, would not establish causation. Are
voter feelings of powerlessness and alienation caused by views on campaign finance, is the
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more than one time period in several states (before, during, and
after ballot proposition campaigns),s and revealed that alienation
and cynicism went up as spending increased (perhaps the public
even attributed its alienation to the big spending), this would be
the strongest evidence possible to support the conclusion that
money was undermining the democratic process."'
This study would not, however, be without potential problems.
One is that the same amount of money can be used with differing
saliency. If campaigners were to spend their coffers primarily on
mass media advertising, the public would more likely be aware of
the spending than if the campaigners used the money to create a
political infrastructure that ran the campaign. Polling, however,
could determine the saliency of money in the campaigns. Another
problem would be that citizens might not understand different
types of campaign finance procedures. Although the courts seem to
have closed off expenditure ceilings and general contribution lim-
its, they have left the door open for other methods of regulation."8
reverse true, or are both caused by some additional factor(s)? Multiple polling over the
course of a campaign and/or polling of the same individuals over time would help determine
causation.
93. Unanswered here is whether the study should be series of random sample polls or
an ongoing panel study. A panel offers the advantage of polling the same people over time,
so that the study would capture information on how an individual is influenced over time.
The disadvantages, however, are that continued polling is a more obtrusive, potentially bias-
ing measure, and that attrition always occurs in long-term studies. For more on the merits
and limitations of different polling methods, see D. NIMINO & J. COMBS, SUBLIMINAL POLITICS
(1980); L. SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS (1981).
94. Commentator Gilbert Gaynor suggests how empirical evidence might be assembled
and recommends that post-election research focus on those who did not vote. Note, supra
note 24, at 456, 462-67. Noting that defenders of large contributors will always argue that
the merits of a contributor's position rather than the money caused the campaign success,
Gaynor responds, "The larger the number of separate electoral campaigns looked to, the less
persuasive it is ... to maintain that the results achieved proceeded from the merits, rather
than from sheer economic power." Id. at 463. But see Note, State and Local Limitations on
Ballot Measure Contributions, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1446-49 (1981) (noting the difficulty
of establishing a "causal nexus" between large campaign contributions and the undermining
of democratic processes). The notewriter argues that if undermining democratic processes is
defined as voter apathy, available empirical evidence does not support the contention that
unlimited spending leads to voter apathy. Although evidence presented in the Note empha-
sizes the difficulty financial limitation supporters face in attempting this sort of proof, the
evidence hardly resolves the question of whether big money undermines citizen confidence
in the process of direct democracy. See infra p. 27 & note 106. Perhaps something as simple
as the Field Poll provides the evidence needed. FIELD INSTITUTE, supra note 90, at 2-3.
95. See infra Part V. Also, some might say that the arguments accompanying the
money, rather than the money itself, contributed to voter alienation. The two are obviously
closely linked. See also Nimmo, supra note 56 (suggesting scholars consider possible vari-
eties of media impact). Researchers need better instruments for studying media impact and
the susceptibility of different people to media influence. This study would not overcome
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The wording of the survey questions would be important. Re-
searchers already have compiled conflicting data on whether the
American public supports public financing of congressional elec-
tions, with the Gallup Poll finding in the affirmative and the Civic
Service finding in the negative. e6 Pollster Lou Harris has found
strong opposition by the public to many features of campaign tele-
vision commercials. An overwhelming majority agreed with the
statements that "there ought to be a strict limit on the amount
that can be spent on TV commercials" and that "there ought to be
enough free commercial time given to major candidates to allow
the voters to get to know them. 97
If this study were done and it did not reveal a relationship
between a lack of confidence in the electoral process and a desire
for campaign finance reform, it would not necessarily mean that
money was not making a major impact or was not perverting the
democratic process. Money could be determinative-with or with-
out deceptive advertising-without citizens recognizing its impact.
Very likely this occurs in ballot proposition campaigns, with cam-
paigners attempting to hide the amount and source of funding."8
There is increasing evidence that most voters do not have even
vague ideas about how much and from what sources money is fun-
nelled into campaigns. A study by the Rand Corporation of the
nuclear safety initiative in California in 1976 found voters' knowl-
edge surprisingly lacking on the sources and amount of campaign
funds. In a post-election poll, the authors found that only 37% of
those who voted on the proposition knew that opponents had spent
more money on advertising. Yet, the opponents had spent roughly
three million dollars more than the proponents (or nearly four
times as much), and supporters had tried to make this fact a major
these problems.
96. For a discussion of the difference, see H. ALEXANDER, supra note 21, at 150; D.
NIMMO & J. COMBS, supra note 93, at 182-83. Gallup and Civic Service used different word
cues; Civic Service emphasized the proposal's negative feature.
97. Eighty-four percent and seventy-nine percent agreed, respectively, with the two
statements. Campaign Finance Reform Proposals of 1983: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Rules & Admin., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983) (presentation of the Harris Sur-
vey: Public Fed Up with Political TV Ads, 492-93). Taken in late November, 1982, the Har-
ris Survey overall results showed an overwhelming fear of the power of television commer-
cials to deceive the public. Id. at 492. Commercial advertising researchers give even more
credence to the influence of television commercials and have found that "relative advertis-
ing expenditures appear to be more important than relative prices in allocating sales among
industries." W. COMANOR & T. WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKET POWER 239 (1974).
98. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. With improvements in our knowledge of
the impact of money, we are becoming more aware of attempts to disguise funding sources.
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campaign issue.e9
These results imply what many have suspected: even with dis-
closure laws, ordinary voters do not know who is contributing to
campaigns or how much money is being contributed. In addition,
like all of us, voters may forget the source of a particular argument
they have heard, making it more difficult for them to assess the
credibility of a particular claim. 100 For this reason, the research de-
sign also should examine the efficacy of disclosure laws, and ask
people whether they are aware of the sources of campaign funds,
and whether one side has greater financial resources than the
other. Because advocates of disclosure laws often tout them as ade-
quate alternatives to stronger campaign finance laws, 101 the an-
swers to these questions could be important.
Given the above problems, negative results in the research
would not quiet the fears of those who believe wealthy contributors
are too powerful in ballot proposition campaigns. Rather, the point
of the research would be that positive findings might be the only
evidence sufficient to persuade a majority on the Supreme Court to
allow limitations or prohibitions on campaign spending to stand.
But, given the Court's confused signals in this area, it might choose
to ignore even positive results.
Regardless of the findings, other data would be useful to cor-
roborate or qualify the results of survey research. If the percentage
of small or individual contributions, as opposed to corporate con-
tributions, were to drop either suddenly or gradually during a cam-
paign it could be an indication that citizens felt that giving to bal-
lot proposition campaigns was becoming futile.0 2 Although some
research indicates this phenomenon and other research dramati-
cally illustrates the power of large corporations to overcome many
small individual contributions, researchers could document more
carefully the place of small contributions in ballot proposition
campaigns.0 3 Pollsters could correlate this data with voter turnout
99. D. HENSLER & C. HENSLER, supra note 63, at 128. The opponents spent $4,033,590,
and the proponents spent $1,255,199. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION, CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTION AND SPENDING REPORT, JUNE 8, 1976 PRIMARY ELECTION 289-98 (1976). The
State of Michigan is seeking to preserve its contribution limitation law, and as a conse-
quence, is concerned about this point. See infra text accompanying notes 135-41.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 146-51.
101. See infra note 126.
102. The city of Berkeley offered some evidence of this occurrence in defense of its
campaign finance law, however the opposition rebutted the city's inferences from the evi-
dence. See infra note 120.
103. See id.; see also Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 577 (how a few large corporate
contributors can overwhelm many smaller individual contributors); Lyndenberg, supra note
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for ballot propositions to see if a decline in small individual contri-
butions corresponded with a lower voter turnout.104 Because the
level of voting on an issue seems to correlate with the amount of
controversy and publicity surrounding a measure," 5 big spending
may increase the number of people who vote-even as it may si-
multaneously increase alienation and a sense of unfairness among
the electorate. A research design such as that outlined above
should be able to measure these dual phenomena.' 6
Researchers also should interview those who have spearheaded
initiatives to determine their perception of the role of money in
campaigns.1 0 7 Unquestionably, many of the citizens groups that
have encountered financial behemoths have been disillusioned.
One citizen, a state representative in Colorado, who worked ac-
tively on a tax reform initiative that was outspent twenty-one to
one, commented two years later, "I wasn't about to get involved
this year on initiatives, unless I knew I would have some money or
no opposition.' 0 8 Another citizen, a leader in the Ohio mandatory
deposit initiative, felt "deeply frustrated that there was no way the
Ohio Alliance for Returnables could afford to buy media time or
66, at 33 (same). For example, in the 1978 Public Smoking Initiative, contributions to pro-
ponents totalled only one-tenth of what opponents (the tobacco industry) received. Yet,
only $70,911 of the opponents' six million dollars came from contributions under $1,000
whereas proponents gained $547,422, or eight times as much, from small contributions, even
while their opponents were in the process of overwhelming them.
104. Here also researchers are confronted with the problem of possible multiple causa-
tion. Many factors are undoubtedly involved in declining voter turnout. Analysts could find
the relative importance of the factors extremely important to the accuracy of their research.
Note, supra note 94, at 1446-49 (briefly discusses the complexity of declining voter turnout);
see also W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 6. (The fact that ballot propositions normally
coincide with other races complicates the assessment of the relative alienating power of dif-
ferent races). Existing evidence indicates that ballot propositions do not draw many voters
to the polls, except in rare circumstances such as California's Proposition 13 in 1978. See
Everson, The Effects of Initiatives on Voter Turnout: A Comparative State Analysis, 34 W.
POL. Q. 415 (1981).
105. See, e.g., J. Shockley, supra note 62, at 3, 45.
106. People may become more cynical and alienated even as they vote, suspecting that
they are being manipulated although they do no not know by whom. That voters have insti-
tuted so many campaign finance reform measures on ballot proposals indicates that people
realize their susceptibility to electoral manipulation and want to reduce its occurrence. The
Field Institute poll clearly states that the majority feels the "will of the people" is being
thwarted by money. FIELD INSTITUTE, supra note 90, at 2-3.
107. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the City and County of San Francisco at 15-16, Citi-
zens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
108. J. Shockley, supra note 62, at 43. The Colorado situation was striking because not
a single consumer or environmental group even tried to place another initiative on the ballot
in the two general election's following 1976.
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space to refute the opposition [sic] charges." 10 9
Feelings of frustration and helplessness abound among initia-
tive activists on campaigns where opposition money engulfs them.
Given the Court's apparent concern with public perception, the be-
lief that money determines ballot proposition winners may be as
serious a problem as the actual fact. Without doubt, the view that
money can defeat proposals has quieted some groups that other-
wise would have begun initiatives. It has alienated many of the
people who have seen support for their cause evaporate with the
onslaught of money and have found themselves without an effec-
tive way to respond. 10
With the considerable and growing amount of money that is
spent yearly for comprehensive polling on ballot measures to deter-
mine precise strategies for influencing voters, it would be ironic
and perhaps tragic if no thorough research addressed the admit-
tedly difficult questions that the courts have raised. The judiciary
has thus far refused to accept legislative and voter determination
of the need to limit contributions and spending on ballot proposi-
109. Lynda James, Ohio Alliance for Returnables Activist, has commented:
They created concern about job losses with false figures, ignoring the fact that
other states with deposit laws have shown a large net increase in jobs. They
repeatedly emphasized that "forced deposit" laws in Oregon, Vermont, and
Michigan were disasters, and that is a complete distortion of the truth. They
also neglected to tell the voters that their alternative litter-control law would
amount to a one percent tax by the time it reached the consumer, would create
another bureaucracy at a cost of $15 million a year, and would do nothing to
stop littering. The alternative was a sham. The Ohio Manufacturers League and
the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, which were a part of Ohioans for a Practical
Litter Law, are now actively opposing passage of a litter law in the state
legislature.
Cahn, supra note 27, at 109. Outspent more than sixteen to one in the campaign, propo-
nents saw their 80% approval margin wither away to a disastrous defeat on election day. Id.
at 107, 109. This syndrome is common on ballot proposition campaigns where proponents
with limited financial resources must battle heavily financed opponents. See Cahn, supra
note 27.
110. Daniel Lowenstein, in support of contribution limitations on ballot issues, has
said:
[This] would remove a very serious inhibition that exists against groups using
the initiative process. Many groups recognize, under the present circumstances
• . . that if they qualify an initiative, they will face. . . over-whelming spending
against them, deceptive advertising against them, which they have little or no
chance [of overcoming], no matter how good their proposal may be on the mer-
its, and no matter how popular it may be with the voters at large ....
Deposition of Daniel Lowenstein at 57, Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin,
577 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Mich. 1983). Therefore, they don't act, "and the result is that we
have less political activity, less political speech, and less opportunity for the people to use
the initiative in the way that was intended when the initiative was adopted." Id. (deposition
on file with the author).
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tions, and apparently will not accept mere proof of impact as con-
stitutionally sufficient grounds to justify restrictions. Thus, the
survey also must address the more difficult questions of whether
money is "threaten[ing] imminently to undermine democratic
processes" and to "destroy the confidence of the people in the...
integrity of government." '111 Can any study show this to the satis-
faction of a majority on the Supreme Court, or are the standards
that the Court has set deliberately so high and so vague that such
a study can never be convincing? Legal scholars are themselves di-
vided on this point.112 If it is not possible to convince the Court
with evidence of this sort, can other arguments be marshalled to
persuade the Court, or can otheriways be found to limit the impact
of money?
IV. RECENT CASES: OTHER ARGUMENTS FOR REFORM
The 1981 Supreme Court case of Citizens Against Rent Con-
trol v. City of Berkeley s (hereinafter CARC) and the Eastern Dis-
trict Court of Michigan case of Michigan State Chamber of Com-
merce v. Austin, 4 provide observers with a good summary of the
dilemmas and prospects reformers face. The city of Berkeley had
originally passed an initiative banning corporate and union contri-
butions to ballot measure campaign committees, but this was in-
validated in Pacific Gas and Electric v. City of Berkeley.135 Fol-
lowing Buckley, the city repealed a number of sections of the
ordinance that limited expenditures on ballot measure campaigns,
but it retained the section at issue in CARC that imposed contri-
bution limitations. Even though the Supreme Court of California
111. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
112. There has been considerable- debate over whether reasonably accessible informa-
tion would convince the Court that money is undermining citizen confidence in the demo-
cratic process. After Bellotti, Professor Lawrence Tribe wrote that the Court was not neces-
sarily banning corporate prohibitions, "provided the ban was designed to meet
substantiated concerns and not simply unfocussed findings." L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 59
n.14. Thomas Kiley, who had argued the case before the Supreme Court of the United
States, was more pessimistic, saying "the broad sweep of the opinion as a whole would stand
in stark contrast to [a] narrow reading of the case." He did not think that "the Common-
wealth simply failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that corporate financial participa-
tion in a political campaign would unduly influence the electoral process." Kiley, supra note
43, at 429 n.ll. More recent legal analysis has continued to reflect this disagreement. See
infra note 125.
113. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
114. 577 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
115. 60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1976).
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upheld the law in a 4-3 decision, 116 the city of Berkeley sensed that
the available information on the impact of money on the outcome
of ballot campaigns was so inconclusive that, on appeal to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, the city should restructure its
arguments. The city, in the end, put at least as much emphasis
upon the argument that its municipal ordinance was constitutional
on grounds of disclosure as it did upon the grounds of preventing
undue influence in the initiative process." 7 The city placed great
weight on the argument that its $250 limitation on contributions to
a political committee contesting a local ballot issue (with no limits
on the amount any person or corporation could spend directly) en-
abled citizens to better assess the source of money in campaigns.
The city argued that this measure did not necessarily restrict the
overall amount of money that campaigners would spend. Because
campaign committees often use misleading names and need not ac-
knowledge their funding source in advertising, the city argued that
voters would be misled less easily about propositions if individual
or corporate donors had to make their large contributions in their
116. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742,
167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980); see also Note, supra note 24 (discussing CARC); Limits on Contri-
butions, supra note 13 (same); Note, supra note 94 (same). Although the Supreme Court of
California had found enough evidence to warrant Berkeley's concern over the impact of
large contributions on the political process, the dissent sharply criticized the majority for
relying upon "unquestioned and unverified" evidence, which did "not constitute the hard
evidentiary support needed to demonstrate a state's present and compelling interest in the
suppression of. . . First Amendment rights ... " Pacific Gas, 27 Cal. 3d at 835, 614 P.2d at
752, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (Richardson, J., dissenting); see also infra note 120.
The Supreme Court of California's majority opinion exhibited the kind of confusion
that is common on the matter of what constitutes corruption, undue influence, and declining
citizen confidence in the electoral process. After saying that a "nexus between voter apathy
and large campaign contributions" exists, the majority quoted from another study that did
not find voters "apathetic, cynical, or ignorant" toward initiatives, even though the study
found the influence of money to be "corrosive . . . pervert[ing] the democratic process
. ... Id. at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
117. See Brief for Appellee, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290 (1981). This Article does not, however, cover all the arguments the city used to support
its statute, nor the variety of points made by appellants against it.
Recently, attorney Jeffrey Blum advanced two more reasons why expenditure and con-
tribution limitations or prohibitions in ballot issue campaigns should be viewed as contain-
ing valid regulatory interests. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Function-
alist Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1273, 1380 n.394 (1983). First, "the referendum process can be seen as an extension of the
legislature's internal deliberative process. Expenditure limitations can be seen as analogous
to decisions to prohibit lobbyists from attending closed sessions of the legislature." Second,
as a means of guaranteeing territorial integrity, states already strictly prohibit individuals
from one state crossing over to vote in another state's elections. A limitation on campaign
funds from nonresidents might be upheld for the same reason.
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own name. Citing one example, the city noted that on a measure
relating to municipal ownership of electric facilities for the city,
certain citizens formed a "Southwest Berkeley No No No on W
Committee;" yet, Pacific Gas and Electric Company provided all of
the Committee's contributions."' The title was even more decep-
tive than it first appeared, because Southwest Berkeley is the mi-
nority section of the city." 9 The Supreme Court's high, if not un-
clear, standards and the city's own unusual experience with money
in ballot proposition campaigns greatly complicated Berkeley's ar-
guments concerning the impact of money on citizen confidence and
participation in ballot propositions. Although Berkeley cited evi-
dence of decline in individual contributions and in voter turnout,
and noted the greater number of victories by the side spending the
most money, no comprehensive analysis supported the proposition
that the spending of money clearly impacts upon ballot proposition
campaigns in a predictable manner.120 The city's objective in limit-
118. Brief for Appellee at 24, CARC, 454 U.S. 290.
119. Oral Argument for Appellee at 30-34, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (argued by Natalie West, Berkeley City Attorney, on Oct. 13,
1981). Deceptive committee names that mask big contributions are common. For example,
in Missouri, in 1980, opponents to a nuclear safety initiative advertised themselves as a
"citizens committee of over 25,000 Missouri men and women," and later as a "committee of
over 1,000 Missouri scientists and physicans." There was never any evidence of who these
25,000 or 1,000 people might be, and of the total of $1,790,157 contributed to the opposition
campaign, $1,782,784, or more than 99.5%, came from business sources. Id. at 64-65;
Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 4-5.
120. Appellants charged that "Berkeley merely recites selective statistics in an attempt
to show that fewer people are voting now than in certain years past." Appellants' Reply
Brief at 7, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). The
appellants noted that the appellees cited statistics showing that Berkeley voter participation
decreased from 65.9% in April 1973 to 45.6% in April 1981. Appellants argued that the
appellee discriminately selected the statistics and that in 1953 the turnout was only 38.8%
increased to 83.3% in 1963, and decreased to 43.1% in 1979. Id. at 8-9. Although Berkeley
cited statistics of a statewide decline of 58% in contributions by individuals between 1978
and 1980 that both the city and the California Fair Political Practices Commission found
alarming, appellants argued that the difference resulted from having fewer hotly contested
issues on the ballot in 1980. Id. at 9. Although Berkeley conceded that there was not a direct
correlation between money spent and the outcome of a municipal ballot proposition, the city
cited the "widespread public perception that large amounts of money skew the outcome of
ballot measure campaigns" and noted that several recent studies supported these percep-
tions. Brief for Appellee at 11, CARC. Appellants pointed out that in Berkeley between 1977
and 1980, the side spending the most money succeeded in only three of the six contested
ballot measures in which contributions exceeded the $250 limit. Appellants Reply Brief at 9,
CARC. These rebuttals called attention to the lack of strong empirical evidence relating
specifically to the City of Berkeley that might have bolstered its case and to the possible
uniqueness of Berkeley's experience with money on ballot proposition campaigns. See infra
hotes 130-31 and accompanying text. Of course, the Field Institute data was not available at
the time. See FIELD INSTITUTE, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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ing contributions rather than expenditures was to avoid having the
Court strike down the ordinance under the Bellotti holding that
prohibitions on expenditures are invalid. Berkeley expected, or at
least hoped, that the Supreme Court would find its ordinance a
less severe infringement upon first amendment rights, because, in
Buckley, the Court had found that a contribution limitation "en-
tails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to
engage in free communication."' 21 In California Medical Associa-
tion v. Federal Election Commission,'22 a plurality of the Court
held that " 'speech by proxy' is not the sort of... advocacy that
this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment
protection."'' 2 3
The majority in the CARC decision, however, made no distinc-
tion between expenditures and contributions on ballot propositions
and merely stated that limitations on either are unconstitu-
tional. 24 Under these heightened standards, Berkeley failed to pre-
sent sufficiently convincing empirical evidence on the issue of un-
dermined citizen confidence. 125 In response to the city's argument
121. 424 U.S. at 20-21.
122. 454 U.S. 182, 196 (1981).
123. Id. at 196.
124. "[Rleferences to Buckley relate to contributions to candidates and their commit-
tees; the case before us relates to contributions to committees favoring or opposing ballot
measures." CARC, 454 U.S. at 299 n.6.
125. What keeps the issue of evidence unclear and tantalizing, even after CARC, is that
the Court keeps referring to empirical evidence as if it could make a difference, although
none of the majority gives any clear suggestion of what would constitute satisfactory proof.
This indicates that (1) better evidence would convince some of the justices, or (2) some of
the justices are using the lack of empirical evidence as an excuse for striking down the
restrictions, and/or (3) some of the justices are uncomfortable and uncertain of .what social
science evidence can and cannot convincingly "prove." Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Burger stated that "the record in this case does not support the California Supreme
Court's conclusion that [the Berkeley statute] is needed to preserve voters' confidence in the
ballot measure process." CARC, 454 U.S. at 299. Does this imply that a more detailed record
might support such a conclusion or that the Court would allow another town with a differ-
ent record to use campaign finance reform methods that Berkeley could not use? See infra
note 132. Justice Marshall stated: "[I1f I found that the record disclosed sufficient evidence
to justify the conclusion that large contributions to ballot measure committees undermined
the 'confidence of the citizenry in government' . . . I would join Justice White." CARC, 454
U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 790 (1978)). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, stated in his concurring
opinion that "Berkeley has neither demonstrated a genuine threat to its important govern-
mental interests nor employed means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of
protected activity" and "[t]he city's evidentiary support in this case is equally sparse."
CARC, 454 U.S. at 302-03 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Thus, these justices have indicated
that if a comprehensive record existed showing that money undermined citizen confidence
in the process, they would be convinced of the need for campaign finance limitations.
Justice White, alone in voting to uphold the Berkeley statute, seemed to acknowledge
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that the measure was justified on the ground of disclosure, the
the barriers that the majority erected to prevent empirical evidence from convincingly
resolving the dispute. Justice White stated: "While it is not possible to prove that heavy
spending 'bought' a victory on any particular ballot proposition, [the] widespread conviction
in legislative halls, as well as among citizens, that the danger is real" is sufficiently convinc-
ing. CARC, 454 U.S. at 307, 311 (White, J., dissenting).
With these signals from the Court, legal scholars seeking to interpret the decision con-
tinued with views as diverse as the justices. On one end of the spectrum is the strong state-
ment that the CARC decision "lays to rest the possibility that Buckley and Bellotti together
would countenance the preservation of confidence in government as a compelling state in-
terest that could justify campaign spending controls." The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96
HARV. L. REV. 62, 165 (1982). On the other end of the spectrum is the more carefully pessi-
mistic statement that a narrowly drawn statute must demonstrate "a high correlation, if not
causal relationship, between the more financially endowed sides in ballot measure cam-
paigns and the winning sides of those elections and show by means of surveys or other
evidence that the faith of the people in the integrity of elections has been gravely under-
mined." Hoffman, Legislative Regulation of Campaign Financing After Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley: A Requiem, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 563, 582 (1982) (footnotes
omitted). Commentator Hoffman calls these tests the "virtually insurmountable barriers
that have been constructed piece-by-piece by the Burger Court . I..." d  at 582. Other
pessimistic commentators have stated: "[T]he CARC decision makes it clear that the politi-
cal system will have to be virtually crumbling before a political spending restriction will be
upheld in the ballot measure setting." Lansing & Sherman, The "Evolution" of the Su-
preme Court's Political Spending Doctrine: Restricting Corporate Campaign Contributions
to Ballot Measure Campaigns After Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, Cali-
fornia, 8 J. CORP. L. 79, 108 (1982).
For other commentators with more optimistic viewpoints, see Baldwin G. Karpay, Cor-
porate Political Free Speech: U.S.C. § 441b and the Superior Rights of Natural Persons,
14 PAc. L. J. 209, 231 n.149 (1983) (concluding that Justices Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor,
White, and Rehnquist would uphold narrowly drawn corporate campaign restrictions, pro-
vided the evidence is "(1) a specific study focusing on the jurisdiction enacting the statute,
or (2) a study specifically relied on by a legislative body in enacting the corporate restric-
tions"); Nicholson, supra note 47, at 741 ("[11f the majority opinion in Berkeley is read
narrowly, or if one or more Justices stray from the Chief Justice's fold, a majority of the
Court could uphold limitations on contributions in ballot measure elections if an adequate
record is presented showing loss of voter confidence caused by large contributions."); Note,
supra note 24, (Despite writing before the CARC decision, the author went the furthest in
suggesting how a study could amass the necessary empirical evidence.). Although Nicholson
believes presenting an adequate record will be "a very difficult task," she exhorts research-
ers to "continue to amass statistics showing domination by large contributors," especially
"to connect the alienation of voters to the perception that large contributors dominate such
elections." Nicholson, supra note 47, at 741-42.
Adding to the confusion over what the Burger Court will or will not allow as convincing
evidence, Archibald Cox agrees with Hoffman, Lansing, and Sherman on the difficulty of
establishing an empirical record that convincingly demonstrates the impact of money, but
he nonetheless believes this may not be necessary:
Although it would seem difficult, if not impossible, to prove categorically the
factual connection that Justices Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor found not to
have been demonstrated, it seems quite probable that judicial understanding
may change as public comprehension of the evil increases. Counsel advising leg-
islative committees and litigating these constitutional issues may well be able to
establish stronger records by expert testimony and the recitation of findings in
committee reports and findings by a judge upon evidence.
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Court held that Berkeley's current disclosure statute already satis-
fied the voters' need for knowledge on the sources of campaign
funds.126
Berkeley's failure before the Supreme Court heightened the
need for new arguments and new evidence to achieve campaign fi-
nance reform. New approaches to the general issue of undue influ-
ence of money in ballot proposition campaigns are necessary, be-
cause Berkeley's method, which was an attempt to adhere to the
Court's escalating and unclear standards, was already quite lim-
ited. The city's original campaign finance reform law of 1974 had
been much more comprehensive. It more effectively would have
prevented vastly disparate campaign spending. The city justified
the 1974 ordinance by what it thought was the constitutional goal
of providing greater equality in campaign participation by restrict-
ing monied interests. But, by dropping both corporate spending
prohibitions and general expenditure limitations in response to
court rulings, Berkeley, by 1981, had had much of the original jus-
tification for its law declared unconstitutional. Because of its weak-
ened ability to fulfill its original purpose, the Berkeley ordinance
was vulnerable to the Court striking it down. 27
Even if the law had survived the Court's scrutiny, however, it
would have been merely one step toward balancing the unequal
impact of spending on ballot proposition campaigns. For example,
San Francisco, with its own contribution limitation of $500, had
found that committees still found ways to raise considerable sums
of money. 28 Opponents defeated the rent control initiative of 1978
Cox, Constitutional Issues in the Regulation of the Financing of Election Campaigns, 31
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 395, 418 (1982).
126. Chief Justice Burger confidently announced that "[h]ere, there is no risk that the
Berkeley voters will be in doubt as to the identity of those whose money supports or op-
poses a given ballot measure .. " CARC, 454 U.S. at 298. Burger, however, also noted that
campaign committees "often adopt seductive names that may tend to conceal the true iden-
tity of the source." Id.; see D. HENSLER & C. HENSLER, supra note 63; infra text accompany-
ing notes 135-41. The Berkeley disclosure ordinance was in fact stricter than many because
it required the city to publish the names of contributors in city newspapers twice in the last
week of the election.
127. Burger commented: "To place a Spartan limit-or indeed any limit-on individu-
als wishing to band together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none
on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association." CARC, 454
U.S. at 296. Noting this aspect of the law, Justice White stated in his dissenting opinion
that it is "tailored to the odd measurements of Buckley and Bellotti .... It is for that very
reason perhaps that the effectiveness of the ordinance in preserving the integrity of the
referendum process is debatable." Id. at 303-04 (White, J., dissenting).
128. Levering, How the Landlords Stretch the $500 Spending Limit, San Francisco
Bay Guardian, Oct. 26, 1978, at _. The newspaper reporter uncovered a memo from consul-
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by contributing more than a quarter of a million dollars. They also
spent money directly, outfinancing the tenant proponents by
twenty-five to one.129 This illustrates the inherent weakness of laws
imposing contribution limitations.
At the same time that San Francisco voters narrowly defeated
rent control, Berkeley voters approved a similar rent rebate ordi-
nance.130 Coming only one year after the election from which the
CARC case stemmed, support for some type of rent control had
grown because the passage of Proposition 13 statewide had drasti-
cally lowered property taxes and afforded landlords significant sav-
ings. The rent rebate proposition in Berkeley passed even in the
face of the city's inability to enforce its contribution limitation.
Because of successful litigation, opponents of rent control were
able to contribute over $330,000 to the campaign, nearly all of it in
amounts of over $250. Proponents, on the other hand, had less
than $8,000 to spend.' The success of the rent control proposi-
tion, despite tremendous financial opposition, demonstrates that
although significant spending often leads to defeat, the large scale
expenditure of money does not always mean defeat. 132
In Santa Cruz, another California city with a contribution lim-
itation, the Lockheed Corporation simply decided to bypass the
limit through direct expenditures and defeated a ballot proposition
tants for the opposition that encouraged contributors to maximize their gifts by making
contributions in their own names, spouse's name, adult children's names, corporation name,
and partnership names. The memo concluded: "If you are a partner in a dozen different
partnerships, all twelve partnership may contribute the full amount as partnerships." Id. at
129. See Levering, How Did Prop. U Lose in a City with 70% Renters?, San Francisco
Bay Guardian, Nov. 16, 1978, at _. The newspaper reporter states that "money was the
major factor in [the] defeat, according to most people we contacted who were familiar with
the campaign." The measure lost by a narrow margin-52.7% to 47.3%.
130. Id; see also BERKELEY FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES COMMISSION, REPORT ON CAM-
PAIGN SPENDING IN BERKELEY BALLOT MEASURE CAMPAIGNS 1977-1980 (May 13, 1981) (noting
that the rent tax relief measure passed by a 58.1% margin).
131. Id. at 1, 13-17. The contribution limitation was not in force between 1977 and
1980.
132. See supra notes 75, 120. As California officials involved in the case were aware,
Berkeley's experience with the impact of money on ballot measures has been different from
that of San Francisco or the state as a whole. Interviews with city officials in Berkeley and
San Francisco (April, 1982). Monied interests have not dominated ballot measures in Berke-
ley as much as elsewhere. A possible explanation is perhaps that the city is a much smaller
community than San Francisco or the state itself, thereby allowing easier and more effective
campaign responses to monetary influence. Another possible explanation is perhaps that
Berkeley is a more highly educated community than most. In addition, citizens voted on the
issue of rent control repeatedly, so that over time voters became familiar with the issue.
Although the monied position won the vote in 1977, it lost the next two votes.
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that would have banned the production or testing of nuclear weap-
ons in the county. In spending $213,685 against the proposal,
Lockheed was the only financial opponent of the measure, and it
outspent proponents, who relied on small contributions, by more
than five to one.133 These recent examples from California munici-
palities indicate that as a method of campaign finance reform on
ballot propositions, the contribution limitation is not necessarily
an effective prophylactic for undue influence in ballot proposition
campaigns, even if the Supreme Court had upheld its constitution-
ality. The opponents avoided the limitations by disbursing the
gifts through various family members and business partnerships
and through direct expenditures. CARC and other Court decisions
reduce the importance of contribution limitation weaknesses be-
cause in these decision the Court has held that these limitations
are unconstitutional. Nonetheless, reformers who still search for ef-
fective and yet constitutional ways to limit the impact of money on
ballot propositions, should not overlook these loopholes for avoid-
ing compliance with limitation ordinances. 134
The most recent judicial struggle has occurred in Michigan.
Because of the uniqueness of the state statute and the quality of
evidence presented in the case, a potential exists for limited con-
trols on ballot proposition contributions to withstand judicial scru-
tiny. Michigan seems to be the last state still enforcing contribu-
tion limitations on ballot propositions. 3 5 The statute applies only
133. Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 90-94. Passage of the measure would likely have
forced a local Lockheed plant that manufactures an explosive detonator, after a five-year
grace period, to convert or shut down.
134. Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 599-600. Professor Lowenstein argued that contribu-
tion limitations would still be helpful because of increased disclosure and because the inabil-
ity to avoid disclosure of massive spending might discourage some groups from contributing.
135. The Michigan Campaign Finance Act, 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 388, codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.201-82 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 4.1703(1)-(82) (Callaghan 1977)). Section 54(3) of the Act provides in part:
A corporation or joint stock company, whether incorporated under the laws of
this or any other state or foreign country, except a corporation formed for politi-
cal purposes, shall not make a contribution or provide volunteer personal ser-
vices . . . in excess of $40,000, to each ballot question committee for the qualifi-
cation, passage, or defeat of a particular ballot question.
1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 388, § 54(3).
Oklahoma, and perhaps other states, have laws on the books limiting contributions by
individuals, corporations, or unions. In Oklahoma, no more than $5,000 can be contributed
to committees working for or against a "state question." OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, ] 15-]101 to -112
(1981). It is unclear whether contributors obey the law, but no one has challenged the law or
attempted to judicially enforce it. See Raley, Constitutional Law: A Price Tag on Expres-
sion: The Constitutional Infirmities of Oklahoma's Ballot Measure Contribution Limita-
tion, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 683 (1983) (arguing that the law is unconstitutional in light of CARC
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to corporations and limits each corporation to $40,000 in contribu-
tions per ballot proposition, with no limit on direct corporate ex-
penditures or individual contributions or expenditures. In 1982,
the major utility companies in the state challenged the present law
and in so doing spent and contributed more than $6.2 million on
three propositions relating to regulation of the utility companies.13 6
Aware of the state law, the utilities avoided the law by directly
expending money on political activities not visible to voters, such
as paying directly for pollsters, salaries, and overhead expenses in
the campaigns. For funding advertising, however, the utilities set
up conduit committees around the state that funneled money into
"Citizens for Michigan Jobs and Energy" and "Voters for Respon-
sible Regulation." Despite the fact that the committees shared the
same treasurer and address, the appearance of multiple campaign
committees enabled the companies to contribute far more than
$40,000 each on each ballot proposition."'
When the state realized what was happening, the Secretary of
State charged the utilities with violating the intent of the law. In
an administrative settlement, the utility companies agreed to pay
the state $130,500 in settlement and agreed not to engage in such
activity again.138 But shortly thereafter, the companies brought
and other Court decisions).
136. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 577 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Mich.
1983). Other parties in the case included James Barrett, President of the Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, and the three large utility companies in the state: Consumers Power
Company, Detroit Edison Company, and Michigan Consolidated Gas Company. The figure
of $6.2 million is derived from official campaign statements filed with the Secretary of State.
The three propositions were: 1) Proposition D (opposed by the utilities), eliminating
automatic pass through rate increases, allowed consideration by the Public Service Commis-
sion of only one requested increase at a time; 2) Proposition H (supported by the utilities
and placed on the ballot by the Michigan legislature) considered a mild alternative to Pro-
position D; and 3) Proposition G (opposed by the utilities because they preferred the cur-
rent system of appointment by the governor) provided for direct election, of the members of
the state's Public Service Commission.
137. Some of the well-known ways the utilities operated involved going "to great
lengths to separate themselves from the two campaign committees" that they had set up.
Utilities Use Subtle Offense To Win at the Polls, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 7, 1982, at Al,
A6. "From beginning to end the committees carefully avoided using the word 'utility' when
describing their supporters" because their polling results indicated considerable voter con-
cern over rising utility costs; 75% of the electorate considered the increases unfair. Id.
138. Wall Street Journal, Mar. 10, 1983 at 7, col. 3. Initiative News Report, Mar. 25,
1983, at 2-3. Michigan's attempt to plug a potential loophole may have strengthened the
chances that the courts will find the act constitutional. In Let's Help Florida v. McCrary,
621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nor. Firestone v. Let's Help Florida, 454 U.S. 1130
(1982), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the striking down of a Florida law limit-
ing contributions to ballot measure committees. In ruling against the state's argument that
restrictions on the size of contributions are necessary to promote adequate disclosure of
[Vol. 39:377
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
suit charging that the law itself was an unconstitutional violation
of the first amendment, as interpreted in Bellotti and CARC. At
the federal district court level, Judge Feikens proceeded in a man-
ner helpful to proponents of reform. Although precedents seemed
to weigh against the constitutionality of the act, he observed that
courts had held such laws unconstitutional because of the absence
of evidence that restrictions prevented undermining the citizenry's
confidence in government. Judge Feikens stated: "The teachings of
Bellotti and Berkeley indicate that in order for contribution limi-
tations to pass constitutional muster, the state must generate an
evidentiary record which clearly demonstrates the compelling need
for such limitations. ' 139 With that, he gave Michigan the opportu-
nity to build an evidentiary record in support of its law. The state
obtained polling and campaign data on the 1982 election. Legal
scholars and political analysts examined this evidence and gave ex-
pert testimony in depositions supporting the Michigan law. 140 The
state gathered evidence showing the inadequacy of current disclos-
ure laws in assuring voter awareness of the source and amount of
campaign expenditures. Further, this evidence suggested voter un-
awareness may have been responsible for the utility companies'
victory at the polls.
Equally important, the state examined the utility companies'
political motive for seeking the right to make unlimited campaign
contributions by contrasting those activities supported by direct
expenditures with those supported by contributions funnelled
through campaign committees. Do corporate efforts to protect
their right to contribute stem from a concern for the first amend-
ment right of "freedom of association" to express views that other-
wise would be "faint or lost?" '' Or do corporations fight for this
campaign financing, the Fifth Circuit commented:
The primary effect of the statutes is to compel large contributors who support or
oppose a referendum issue to form multiple partisan committees, each of which
can receive the maximum amount from a single contributor under the statute.
These multiple partisan committees provide no additional disclosure; the public
still sees only the innocuous names of the different committees, and not the
identities of the underlying contributors.
McCrary, 621 F.2d at 200.
139. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, No. 83-CV-2263-DT (E.D. Mich.
1983) (interlocutory order granting continuance to complete discovery) (final opinion ap-
pears at 577 F. Supp. 651).
140. The author was an expert witness in this case.
141. In CARC, Justice Burger defined the "value" of "volunteer committees" as the
"collective effort individuals can make their views known when, individually, they would be
faint or lost." Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
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right to conceal their campaign involvement and prevent informa-
tion from reaching the public? Michigan argued the latter.
Because the Michigan law was in force during the 1982 elec-
tions, the state can compare and document the different campaign
uses of money laundered through contributions and of money
spent directly by the utilities. With this evidence available to sup-
port its narrowly drawn statute, Michigan may have the best
chance yet of sustaining its contribution limitation law because the
evidence directly refutes the Courts' reasons in CARC for protect-
ing the right of unlimited contributions. Michigan's evidence may
convince a majority of the Court of the true reasons powerful fi-
nancial interests fight the limitation of campaign contributions.142
Yet, the Michigan law still allows individuals, including corpo-
rate executives, to contribute unlimited sums, and all those corpo-
rations with the financial means retain the right to spend unlim-
ited amounts on ballot issues. A victory for Michigan is thus but a
step toward limiting the influence of the financially powerful in di-
rect democracy campaigns.
V. OTHER AVENUES TO REFORM
The Michigan case has only limited applicability to the gen-
eral phenomenon of financial domination of ballot issue campaigns.
Difficulty exists both with conducting a study that could meet the
Court's unclear standards and with compiling evidence that would
overcome the Court's stated reasons for protecting the right to
make unlimited campaign contributions. The values of the jus-
tices 143 may lead to their rejection of new arguments or evidence in
support of directly limiting the expenditure of money in ballot is-
sue campaigns. Thus, persons believing that the expenditure of
large sums of money has too great of an influence upon ballot pro-
Note that in CARC, Burger is speaking only of individuals contribution limitations in ballot
measure campaigns. Corporations would seem quite different because their views would not
be "faint or lost" because of the lack of money to spend directly. The $40,000 limit concedes
that corporations may spend more on political campaigns if they wish.
142. On September 28, 1984, Judge Feikens ruled that the case was not yet ripe for
decision because no corporation had tried to contribute more than $40,000 to a proposition
on the ballot in Michigan in 1984. Ruling in favor of the state, he held that "[i]n these
circumstances, it is apparent that Plaintiffs are motivated not by a desire to engage in first
amendment activity, but by the desire to obtain a declaration that the challenged statute is
unconstitutional." Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, No. 83-CV-2263-DT
(E.D. Mich. 1983) (final opinion appears at 577 F. Supp. 651). He therefore did not address
the merits of the argument. Plaintiffs appealed.
143. These values seem to include such broad philosophical goals as "the right to what
money can buy." L. TRIBE, supra note 13; see also Shockley, supra note 1.
[Vol. 39:377
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
position campaigns need to explore other avenues beside prohibi-
tions or limitations upon campaign contributions and expendi-
tures. No alternate approach will be easy, but several alternatives
seem to follow logically from earlier court opinions.
First, one feasible approach may be to require more stringent
disclosure of campaign contributions without restricting the
amount of money that can be contributed or spent in campaigns.
The evidence now being accumulated demonstrates that voters
often are unaware of the principal donors to campaigns or the
magnitude of funds being spent on ballot propositions cam-
paigns.1 44 If the principal donor(s) to committees had to be dis-
closed in all committee advertising, the average voter would be
more likely to know the source of campaign funds than if state-
ments merely had to be filed periodically with a secretary of state
or city official. Defining "principal donor(s)" and enforcing their
disclosure even on advertisements as short as thirty-seconds would
present difficulties. 45 If states require adequate disclosure at the
time of the advertising, then voters who view "negative cost" ad-
vertising146 will be better able to evaluate the hidden agendas that
so often accompany ballot proposition campaign advertisements.
Viewers will be able to associate the argument with the sponsor in
144. There are still surprising lapses in our disclosure laws. See Schwarz v. Romnes, 495
F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974); Lydenberg, supra note 55; infra note 157. Ruth Jones found that
because state law governs state election financing, considerable variation exists among states
in their reporting requirements and the quality of the data that campaigners report. Thus,
comparative analysis is extremely difficult. JONES, Financing State Elections, in MONEY AND
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 172, 209 (M. Malbin ed. 1984). Moreover, the problems in
garnering good disclosure information seem to be getting worse, not better: "In state after
state, agencies that prepare and publish the official reports ... are under attack." Id. at
209. In many states, "there is neither the mandate nor the resources needed to analyze and
report the data." Id.; see also Issue Campaigns, 2 INITIATIVE Q. 4, 9 (1983) (discussing the
difficulties of comparative analysis of financing, including the problem that "many cam-
paigns involve large unreported costs").
145. Oral Argument for Appellee at -, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berke-
ley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (argued by Natalie West, Berkeley City Attorney, Oct. 18, 1981); see
also Nicholson, supra note 47, at 721 n.204.
146. "[Slome information has a negative cost in that it would take a greater expendi-
ture of resources for the voter to avoid the information than to absorb it." Lowenstein,
supra note 13, at 560. Professor Lowenstein comments: "It would take heroic efforts, and
thereby be prohibitively costly, for a voter to avert his eyes from all the siogans on bill-
boards or in large type in full-page newspaper ads, or to change stations every time a 30-
second spot is presented." Id. at 561; see also Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and
Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 494 (1981).
Professors Patton and Bartlett call this "subsidized information," noting that someone else
wishes the voters to have this information and is "willing and able to pay the voter's costs of
acquisition." Patton & Bartlett, supra note 146, at 504.
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a way that rarely happens now. 147 Simultaneous disclosure also
would allow voters to assess the credibility of the arguments before
they form their perception of the issues.' 8 In such a way, voters
who watched only thirty-second and sixty-second spots could have
learned, for example, that "Californians for Common Sense" was
in fact composed of non-California tobacco companies with a spe-
cial interest in defeating the proposition restricting smoking in en-
closed public places, 49 or that AMAX, a mining company that
stood to pay millions of dollars in extra state taxes if a tax reform
initiative passed, was the primary supporter of a group formed to
challenge the initiative-"Coloradans for Responsible Taxa-
tion."1 50 Apparently, political committees deliberately disguise
their names to avoid disclosure of the true financial interests in-
volved in funding ballot proposition campaigns, and the commit-
tees expend considerable effort in arriving at the most electorally
potent name.' 5'
Efforts to stop such deception received a boost during San
Francisco's nonsmokers' rights referendum campaign in the fall of
1983. Supporters of the measure won an unprecedented victory af-
ter persuading one television station and two radio stations to re-
fuse opposition advertising unless it disclosed that the tobacco in-
dustry funded the opposition committee ("San Franciscans
Against Government Intrusion").12 Vigorous enforcement of sec-
147. Of course, disclosure would not necessarily prevent big spending, any more than
the contribution limitations in Santa Cruz prevented Lockheed from directly spending
nearly a quarter of a million dollars. Lydenburg, supra note 9, at 90-94.
148. Nicholson, supra note 47, at 711.
149. See Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 537-40, 631-32; Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 44-
49; Lydenberg, supra note 66, at 30-34.
150. See Shockley, supra note 62, at 20-29.
151. For example, the tobacco industry employed multiple polling to determine
whether California voters would give less credence to the advertisements if they were aware
that the tobacco industry paid for the political advertisements against the Smoking and No
Smoking Sections initiatives. The polling results revealed that they would in fact be more
likely to vote for the proposition merely because the tobacco industry opposed it. The re-
suits were significant. In the 1980 poll, 67.2% of the California public said they would be
less likely to vote for a proposition endorsed by the tobacco industry. Only 4.2% would be
more likely to vote for it. Yet, if "Californians Against Regulatory Excess," the tobacco
industry's devised name for the 1980 campaign, endorsed a measure, 70.9% would be either
indifferent or more likely to vote for the measure, while only 28.9% would be less likely to
support the measure. Brief for Petitioner at 4, 23, Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
152. Initiative News Report, Oct. 28, 1983, at 3. Section 317 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act requires broadcasters to reveal the true sponsors of political advertisements, but
how sponsorship is defined and how diligently station managers should attempt to verify the
identity of sponsors is subject to dispute. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1982). For more on the FCC's
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tion 317 of the Federal Communications Act requiring broadcast-
ers to reveal the true sponsors of political advertisements, not
those of front organization sponsors with misleading "seductive
names," 153 would be an important step toward more effective cam-
paign funding disclosure. It would also remove the primary incen-
tive monied groups now have for making contributions rather than
direct expenditures. But pressure within the Federal Communica-
tions Commission is for less regulation, not more;5 therefore, ef-
fective enforcement of section 317 will have to await changed cir-
cumstances and/or new appointees.
Second, it follows logically from the Court's statement in Bel-
lotti that corporate shareholders have the right to know the politi-
cal causes that their corporations spend money on. In Bellotti, the
Court stated: "Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the
procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation
should engage in debate on public issues. '155 If, as the Court sug-
gested in Bellotti, shareholders can simply withdraw their capital
from a corporation when they disapprove of the political activities
of the corporation,'5 6 they should know what those political activi-
ties are. In most instances, however, shareholders are not informed
of corporate political activity and find it is difficult to get the infor-
mation when they try.157 A 1980 staff report by the Securities and
Exchange Commission stated that shareholders "must have infor-
regulations, including guideline amorphousness and lack of enforcement, see Brief for Peti-
tioner at 4, 23, Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lowenstein, supra note 13,
at 599-600, n.353.
153. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
154. See Heffron, infra note 176.
155. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794.
156. Id. n.34. For a discussion of this part of the Belotti decision, see Propp, The
SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Corporate Accountability at a Crossroads, 11 SEc. REG.
L.J. 99, 111-13 (1983). Propp, attorney-advisor for the State Department, argues that Justice
Powell did not clarify what procedures were possible for corporate democracy and failed "to
distinguish between accountability for economic and for political activities." Id. at 122.
157. The Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) asked thirteen corporations that were
active in ballot proposition campaigns whether they informed shareholders about the
amount of money that the company contributed to campaigns. The CEP also asked what
management level made the decisions on whether and how much to contribute and how
much in fact the company had contributed over the past five years. Ten of the thirteen
corporations declined to respond. One corporation responded by saying that the answers to
the questions were "confidential" and that aside from reporting contributions when the law
required disclosure, it was "simply not information that we can release." Lydenberg, supra
note 9, at 36-37. Another corporation responded that its contributions were "not the sort of
information which [we] or to our knowledge, other companies ordinarily make available to
stockholders." Id.; see also Patton & Bartlett, supra note 146, at 510 n.32 (discussing SEC
regulations).
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mation on 'Bellotti-type' corporate expenditures in order to evalu-
ate" the corporation. 158 The report suggested that the SEC also
consider "whether disclosure of corporate expenditures for political
activities should be required by the Commission in the annual re-
port to shareholders or the proxy statement.'
59
The SEC neither has taken public action on the 1980 sugges-
tion by its staff nor publicly responded to a petition filed in 1980
by the Institute for Public Representation of the Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center. The petition requested the SEC to require cor-
porations to disclose information about money spent on political
activities to shareholders, including money spent by political ac-
tion committees (PACs). 160 Undoubtedly, the SEC has the author-
ity to require this disclosure as a necessary response to Bellotti,
but getting the SEC to act is another matter entirely.' e
The law is presently in a paradoxical, contradictory state that
benefits corporations. The court in Bellotti excluded much state
regulation of corporate political activity on the false belief that
procedures for "corporate democracy" existed and could be used in
158. DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 96TH
CONG., 2D SESS. STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY B151 196 (Comm. Print 1980).
159. Id. at 200. For further ideas on the need for greater corporate responsibility to
stockholders, see Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the
First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981); Curzan & Pelish, Revitalizing Corporate De-
mocracy: Control of Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues,
93 HARV. L. REV. 670; Nicholson, supra note 47, at 721 n.204; Comment, supra note 35, at
145, 172-75.
160. Petition for an Amendment of Rule 14a-3 to Provide for Corporate Political Activ-
ities to Shareholders, by the Institute For Public Representation of Georgetown University
Law School (IPR) to the Securities and Exchange Commission, File No. 4-235 (July 21,
1980). In June 1982, the Institute also petitioned the SEC to require that corporations re-
port political expenditures for ballot proposition campaigns in quarterly and annual reports
to stockholders. The petitioners noted that corporations not only withheld this information
from stockholders, but also at least one corporation nearly lied to deny its involvement in a
nuclear power campaign. (A draft of the petition is on file with the author.) See also Propp,
supra note 156, at 124-26 (discussing the IPR petitions).
161. Due to a recent turn of events at the SEC, the chances of furthering shareholder
rights to information have diminished or vanished. See NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1982, at 61. It is
difficult to imagine the SEC requiring corporations to report campaign expenditures to their
shareholders when it will not even require corporations to reveal criminal behavior to their
shareholders. For a discussion of SEC confusions and inconsistencies in the wake of Bellotti,
see. Propp, supra note 156.
Theoretically, state governments could require corporations to inform their sharehold-
ers of corporate political activity. The least common denominator syndrome exemplified by
the State of Delaware suggests, however, that action by individual states would not be as
effective and is unlikely to occur. For a discussion of Delaware's impact on corporate char-
tering, see R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 50-61
(1976).
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place of state regulation. Since then, the SEC has refused to re-
quire that corporations practice the "corporate democracy" spoken
of by the Supreme Court.
A third approach could require either (1) that a majority of
shareholders approve any proposed corporate political expression,
possibly with a provision giving a special dividend to objecting
shareholders;'62 or (2) that unanimous shareholder approval pre-
cede all political or noncommercial corporate speech. 6 3 The share-
holder approval procedure need not restrict corporate activity too
much, because the views of many shareholders would probably be
congruent with management decisions.16  To require majority or
unanimous shareholder approval before corporate treasury funds
could be spent on political campaigns would be admirable. Profes-
sor Nicholson has appropriately noted, "Society does not benefit
when dissenters are misrepresented as favoring a policy or candi-
date they actually oppose.""" I
Fourth, governments that allow direct democracy could subsi-
dize ballot proposition campaigns by matching funds and direct
grants, or by a voucher system. 6 6 Many states and the federal gov-
162. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 173-74 (1978). The arti-
cle also suggests that states only permit corporate political expenditures that corporations
finance by voluntary shareholder contributions. Professor Victor Brudney suggests the same
concept in greater detail. See Brudney, supra note 159.
163. See Brudney, supra note 159. The unanimity requirement protects "the rights of
the stockholder against a particular form of 'waste' that is singled out not for its communi-
cative capacity, but because it is more difficult to detect than other forms of [management]
waste, more likely to be used to implement management's personal views and less likely to
create assets that stockholders can recover from errant management." Id. at 251-52. Instead,
Brudney suggests, stockholders could band together in a voluntary structure "parallel to the
business venture, to express themselves on the same subject and in the same way as the
'entity' might have done." Id. at 257.
164. Shareholder contributions would presumably be voluntary, but at least one author
has expressed fears over just how "voluntary" management giving can be when the corpora-
tion will know who refused to contribute. See Mayton, Politics, Money, Coercion, and the
Problem with Corporate PACs, 29 EMORY L.J. 375 (1980). If contributions were to become
truly voluntary, the "free rider" problem could cause a drop in corporate financial activity
on ballot proposition campaigns. If so, corporations would confront problems no worse than
public interest groups face, because they must rely on voluntary contributions to support
their activities. For a more thorough discussion of the free rider problem, see Patton &
Bartlett, supra note 146; infra note 198.
165. Nicholson, supra note 13, at 1005. The Court has drawn a revealing distinction
between concern for the rights of minority shareholders and the rights of union members
who are opposed to particular political activity. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812-20 (White, J.,
dissenting); Patton & Bartlett, supra note 146, at 511 n.35; Comment, supra note 35, at 170
n.136.
166. In a voucher system, the state gives voters vouchers worth a specified amount to
spend on political campaigns of their choice. For more information, see D. ADAMANY & G.
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ernment 67 have already instituted fund and grant matching pro-
grams. 68 The manner of support would vary, depending upon
whether the government placed emphasis upon minimal support,
or upon the maximum expendable amount as now occurs at the
presidential level. 16 9 Political and operational problems would re-
sult and require resolution. One of the most difficult problems
would be to convince legislators and taxpayers to allocate funds for
the program when revenues are declining.' 70 It would be even more
difficult to devise such a system at the municipal level because lo-
calities do not have as much flexibility with revenue sources as
state and federal agencies do.17 1
AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY, Chs. 10-11 (1975). No states yet have adopted a voucher system.
One of the main criticisms of the procedure is the high cost of administering the program.
For a critical response, see Peck & McDowell, infra note 167, at 944 (quoting SPECIAL COM-
MITTEE ON ELECTION REFORM, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SYMPOSIUM ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION (1975)).
167. Seventeen states funded general elections for one or more statewide offices in 1981.
See Bone, Campaign Financing in the States: Broadening the Base, 9 WASH. PUB. POL'Y
NOTES 1 (Winter, 1981); Peck & McDowell, Dollar Democracy: An Analysis of Public Fi-
nancing of State Politics, 15 THE URB. LAW. 921 (1983).
168. Other Western democracies have generally been more supportive of public financ-
ing than the United States. The debate often centers on whether the government should
provide floors or ceilings on campaign spending. For information on funding of ballot pro-
positions, see A. Ranney, Regulating the Referendum, in THE REFERENDUM DEVICE 89-112
(A. Ranney ed. 1981). For information on public funding of elections in Western democra-
cies, see generally D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 166, Ch. 9; E. DREW, MONEY AND
POLITICS (1983); K. PALTIEL, Campaign Finance: Contrasting Practices and Reforms, in DE-
MOCRACY AT THE POLLS 138-72 (D. Butler, H. Penniman & A. Ranney, eds. 1981).
169. Judicial decisions that allow independent expenditures and procedures that re-
quire voluntary acceptance of public funds and expenditure ceilings have complicated ceil-
ings on presidential campaign funds. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95 (1976); Common
Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 496-501 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 129 (1982). Politi-
cal commentator Elizabeth Drew notes that these limits are increasingly ineffective because
of "soft money" contributions and expenditures. Drew, supra note 168, at 12-19.
170. For a sensible proposal that would institute public financing in ballot proposition
campaigns, see Lowenstein, supra note 13, at 578-83. Professor Allen Easley proposed a
"spending differential limit" that would not involve state subsidies, contribution limits or
expenditure limits. It would tie spending by the richer side of a ballot proposition to a ratio
based on the amount the poorer side is spending. Easley, supra note 48, at 749. This
scheme, however, is similar to the repealed California scheme voters adopted in the Political
Reform Act of 1974. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 81000-81016 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982) (parts of
Act repealed in 1977). California repealed the scheme in response to the Buckley decision.
The scheme may be more constitutionally suspect than the one proposed by Lowenstein,
but the feasibility of its passage may be greater. It does not involve taxpayers' dollars, and a
similar proposal has already found favor with California voters. For general reasons why
legislators have not viewed public financing favorably, see for example Quinn, Why the
State Hasn't Bought Public Financing of Elections, CAL. J. 60-62 (Feb. 1978).
171. See Burns, supra note 13, at 1025 n.127. Because those in need of funds always
scramble for public funds in the face of declining government revenues, the chances of im-
plementing public funding appear remote.
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Fifth, the Federal Communications Commission could develop
and refine the "fairness doctrine' 72 and Cullman corollary,17 3 to
prevent one side from dominating the media.174 Political groups
with few financial resources have occasionally made effective use of
cost-free air time'7 but the current mood at the FCC is to weaken
or scrap the doctrine, not to strengthen it.176 There are indications
that forces without money have become more adept at using the
fairness doctrine. On the other hand, forces with money have de-
liberately avoided using funds in ways that would bring the doc-
trine into play.177
Providing public subsidies and strengthening the fairness doc-
trine are two ways to increase access to the political process rather
than to restrict participation by those already politically powerful.
If political opposition to these two routes can be overcome, then
these routes stand an excellent chance of surviving judicial
172. The "fairness doctrine," developed by the Federal Communications Commission,
requires that broadcasters: (1) devote a reasonable percentage of time to the coverage of
public issues and (2) assure the coverage is fair in providing an opportunity for the presen-
tation of contrasting points of view. See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
173. The Cullman doctrine classifies ballot propositions as closer to general political
discussion than discussion involving election of individuals to office. Cullman Broadcasting
Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963). Thus, the FCC requires licensees to present contrasting views,
even if they have to grant free time to a side without money. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1,
33 (1974).
174. For a discussion of media domination and the problems with implementing the
fairness doctrine, see Mastro, supra note 62. For a general review of the fairness doctrine
and equal access questions, see M. FRANKLIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH Es-
TATE 177-203, 571-609 (1981). Political commentator Elizabeth Drew suggests "a ban on the
purchase of airtime and a provision for free airtime." Drew, supra note 168, at 147. She
notes that "America is one of the very few countries in the world that allow any purchase of
television time for political broadcasts; no Western European nation does." Id. at 150.
175. See D. SCHMIDT, BALLOT INITIATIvES: A BRIEF HISTORY, 1980 ELECTION ANALYSIS,
AND A LOOK AT TRENDS 9 (1981); Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 107-10.
176. See, e.g., Koppel, The Applicability of the Equal Time Doctrine and the Reason-
able Access Rule to Elections in the New Media Era, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 499 (1983);
Paper presented by Andrea Bonnicksen, The Supreme Court and the Convergence in Com-
munications Law: Implications for Litigation Strategy, Midwest Political Science Associa-
tion Convention, Cincinnati, Ohio (Apr. 15-18, 1981); Paper presented by Florence Heffron,
The Politics of Deregulation: The Federal Communications Commission, Western Political
Science Association Convention, Denver, Colorado (Mar. 26-28, 1981).
177. For instance, when Dade County, Florida, placed on the ballot its second initiative
to restrict smoking in enclosed public places, tobacco companies switched strategies after
they learned that proponents had made arrangements to have Hollywood celebrities do pub-
lic service announcements under the fairness doctrine. By making extensive use of mass
mailings, telephoning, newspaper advertising, and by avoiding television and radio, tobacco
companies prevented these advertisements from appearing. Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 53-
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scrutiny. 78
Sixth, Oregon now is trying a somewhat more novel approach.
The state has passed legislation permitting false advertising law-
suits in ballot proposition campaigns.179 Many states have tried
this approach in candidate elections, but its use in ballot proposi-
tion campaigns is novel. The results in candidate elections, how-
ever, are not encouraging. Courts have been reluctant to find false
advertising by candidates, partly because this can be viewed as in-
fringement of the first amendment right to freedom of speech and
partly because the worst abuses tend to be deceptions rather than
outright lies.180 Yet, in Oregon, parties in a suit brought by under-
financed proponents reached an out-of-court settlement. Other
lawsuits stemming from 1980 campaigns are in progress but the
parties face numerous difficulties. 8" If the judiciary upholds the
Oregon legislation, and damages are large enough to allow the
under-financed side to be able to respond effectively to their oppo-
nents' charges, this approach could be helpful in overcoming one-
sided public communication. The legislation's remedial effect, how-
ever, may be limited to those campaigns where the side with
money can be proven to have engaged in deliberate deception and
falsehoods.18 2
Analysts have suggested other reforms, but they seem less
promising. These suggested reforms include government-funded
178. Political opposition (as distinct from judicial opposition) may be too great to over-
come, because the issue of using tax dollars to support campaigns is a less popular one
among the public than is the issue of limiting big spenders.
179. OR. REV. STAT. § 260.532 (1979); see Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 29-30.
180. For examples of the difficulties, see Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299 (Minn.
1981); Committee to Retain Judge Jacob Tenzer v. Lee, 270 Or. 215, 527 P.2d 247 (1974).
181. Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 29-30, 83-84, 88-89; Initiative News Report, Feb. 25,
1983, at 5-6.
182. Because the judicial process is slow, the plaintiffs would most likely not receive
any money until after the election was over, although they might receive valuable publicity
during the campaign by bringing the suit. Current difficulties with the Oregon law include a
provision that the side suing must be fully in compliance with the state's reporting
laws-even the slightest discrepancy is sufficient grounds for throwing the suit out of court.
OR. REV. STAT. § 260.532(6) (1979). The side charged with intentional falsehoods thus tends
to respond to the charge by looking for errors in their opponent's compliance with the law.
Without a provision for retroactive compliance, poorly funded groups are handicapped in
their ability to bring successful suits. In addition, there continues to be a dispute within the
judiciary over the constitutionality of the state's false campaign advertising statute. An ear-
lier and unsuccessful attempt to use false advertising lawsuits in a ballot proposition cam-
paign occurred in Colorado in 1976. Shockley, supra note 62, at 31.
For an earlier discussion in California over whether to move against false advertising
claims in initiative campaigns, see Bestoff, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion
for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 922, 938 n.78 (1975).
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voter pamphlets 8 3 and redistributive taxation and spending. 84
Several states send registered voters campaign pamphlets written
by political activists. The pamphlets present arguments for and
against the proposals. Although these pamphlets are helpful to
some voters, they seem no match for the slick advertising cam-
paigns of heavily funded political organizations. In addition, be-
cause the pamphlets are written at a reading level beyond compre-
hension by most of the voting public," 5 they seem unable to
significantly influence the voting public. If ways could be found to
make the pamphlets more understandable to the average voter, the
case for voter pamphlets would be stronger.
Another approach, advocated by one notewriter, begins with
the obvious point that "the pattern of expression that contribution
limits seek to alter are caused by income inequality."' 6 Although
arguing against contribution limitations on first amendment
grounds, the notewriter suggests that "the states could encourage
political expression less restrictively through redistributive taxing
and spending."'1 87 Nonetheless, because income inequality is so
deeply interwoven in the fabric of American society, 88 any attempt
183. Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 140-41; Note, supra note 94, at 1444.
184. Note, supra note 94, at 1452.
185. See Paper presented by David Magleby, Voter Pamphlets: Understanding Why
Voters Don't Read Them, American Political Science Association Convention, New York
(Sept. 5, 1981). Magleby found the ballot descriptions for propositions in the voter pam-
phlets in Oregon and California during the 1970's averaged at the eighteenth grade level
(two years of post graduate work). In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the descriptions
were somewhat more readable, averaging at the fifteenth grade level. Id. at 28. This is far
above the reading level of the average voter. For a summary of these findings, see D.
MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 137-39.
186. Note, supra note 94, at 1452.
187. Id. This point, however, may be useful as a reminder that if it takes money to have
"free speech," then all government taxing and expenditures are constantly affecting the re-
ality of the first amendment. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
Although subsidies and tax credits may be alternative ways to increase small donations
to campaigns, the results of these techniques on candidate elections have been disap-
pointing. Some people believe these methods are a waste of federal money because the great
majority of those who give would have contributed anyway. See Lowenstein, supra note 13,
at 603-04. For a proposal to expand tax credits, see Paper presented by Richard Conlon, A
New Problem in Campaign Financing. . . and a Simple Legislative Solution, 1984 Ameri-
can Political Science Association Convention, Wash., D.C. (Sept. 1, 1984).
188. The extent and the relative stability of income and wealth inequality in American
society is not generally known. See, e.g., R. CHRISTENSON, CHALLENGE AND DECISION, Ch. 5
(1976); G. D. GARSON, POWER AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, Ch. 7 (1976); L. THUROW,
THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY (1978); J. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN INEQUALITY: A MACRO-ECONOMIC
HISTORY (1980). As merely one example, economist Paul Samuelson has noted that "[i]f we
made an income pyramid out of a child's blocks, with each layer portraying $1,000 of in-
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to alter campaign spending patterns through redistributing wealth
in the entire society would be sure to fail-short of major political
upheaval. To cite merely one example of the tremendous financial
disparity that redistributive taxing would have to overcome, Stan-
dard Oil of Ohio (Sohio) spent nearly a million dollars on a city-
wide ballot proposition in Long Beach, California, to assure the
right to construct an oil storage terminal in that city. Only four
months after the election, Sohio cancelled all plans for the termi-
nal, stating that other factors had made the idea no longer attrac-
tive. Sohio sales in 1978 alone were over five billion dollars and
their profits for that year were over four hundred million dollars. 189
With such financial resources at corporate disposal, what sort of
redistributive state and municipal taxation would be necessary to
allow citizens working against large corporations an equal chance
for effective political expression?' 9"
A less promising reform, because of SEC and judicial interpre-
tations, is the institution of shareholder suits. In these suits, share-
holders seek recovery of corporate expenditures on the ground that
the funds are ultra vires political contributions.' 9 ' Although such
actions as Procter and Gamble's little-known decision to contrib-
ute thousands of dollars to defeat a nuclear power referendum in
Missouri might be susceptible to such a suit, 92 corporations have
considerable latitude under articles of incorporation in Delaware
that have allowed a corporation "self-determination" to "conduct
business in any way it chose as long as the state did not explicitly
prohibit it."'95 Under the "business judgment" rule the corpora-
tions enjoy additional latitude.' By arguing that their effort pre-
serves the free enterprise system, corporations may escape the ul-
tra vires charge because courts have so loosely interpreted it so as
come, the peak would be far higher than the Eiffel Tower, but most of us would be within a
yard of the ground." P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 80 (1980). Disparity of wealth is even greater
than disparity of income.
189. Lydenberg, supra note 8, at 4.
190. Any attempt would be sure to raise fears of driving industry and jobs to other
municipalities and other states. For a brilliant account of the myriad difficulties small gov-
ernments face in trying to tax multi-national corporations, see J. GAVENrA, POWER AND
POWERLESSNESS (1981).
191. Nonetheless, such a tactic would be constitutional and politically useful. Brudney,
supra note 159. The difficulty rather lies in changing SEC and judicial priorities.
192. See W. Dobrovir, Memorandum of Law, at 1 (on file with the Council on Eco-
nomic Priorities, New York and on file with the author).
193. Nader, supra note 161, at 52.
194. See Brudney, supra note 159, at 258 n.82; M. Underberg, The Bueiness Judgment
Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 600 (1980).
[Vol. 39:377
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
to be "a virtual immuniser of managerial judgments."' 5 As of early
1984, shareholders had made no attempt to bring ultra vires
charges against any corporation. Additionally, the heaviest spend-
ing on state and local ballot propositions almost always is related
to company business. It is this relatedness that evokes the
spending.
Therefore, these proposals, as well as the previous six avenues
of reform, have serious drawbacks. Each would undoubtedly lead
to some unforeseen consequences, with loopholes or inequities that
would need resolution. None would be easy to implement, both be-
cause they involve changes in long-established practices,'96 and be-
cause money is likely to be used to prevent the enactment or effec-
tive implementation of alternatives. But to stay with the status
quo is to invite the continued actual or potential domination of
ballot proposals by individual, corporate, union, and special inter-
est wealth.'97 The result is the damage to the democratic system
that so many states, municipalities, and citizens have already
perceived.
As long as wealth is as unequally distributed as it is in Ameri-
can society, and political interest groups are organized around pri-
vate rather than public rewards,19 ballot proposition campaigns,
like American politics, generally will reflect the power of the best
195. Brudney, supra note 159, at 258 n.82; Dobrovir, supra note 192. Brudney, how-
ever, believes that a legislative program to regulate corporate political speech based upon
preventing ultra vires speech (waste) and protecting intra vires speech (shareholder consent)
could constitutionally lessen corporate political activity.
196. Many earlier laws in the twentieth century have severely regulated money in elec-
tions, both for candidates and on ballot proposals, in a way that the Burger Court has now
declared unconstitutional. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 21. The irony is that states and
courts rarely enforced these laws. In addition, these laws had serious loopholes, so that de-
cades of legal regulation of campaign finance practices never became legitimized constitu-
tionally or politically. The Burger Court majority has forced a renouncement of this lax
attitude toward campaign finance regulation instead of building upon this history.
197. Corporations are best known in raising considerable sums of money on ballot pro-
position campaigns, but other sectors of the society also have shown they can raise fairly
large amounts of money. Unions have spent substantial sums of money fighting right-to-
work laws, as have professional associations such as dentists and teachers, and single issue
groups like gun owners. Lydenberg, supra note 9, at 126-36 & app. C; Lydenberg, supra
note 66, at 60-63, 76-79. For a discussion of a labor campaign against a right-to-work ballot
issue in Missouri, see Mockus, Geodemographics II: Targeting Your Turnout, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, Summer, 1980, at 55-63. Lydenberg notes that in the 1980 campaigns, forty-nine
of the top fifty-nine contributors were corporations or business associations. See Lydenberg,
supra note 9, app. C.
198. For recent works on the endemic weaknesses of public interest groups, see T. MOE,
THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL IN-
TEREST GROUPS (1980); Lowenstein, supra note 13, 573-80; Patton & Bartlett, supra note
146.
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organized and wealthiest groups in society. With the Court's active
participation, direct democracy is left ever more vulnerable to the
very abuses it seeks to overcome.
